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INTRODUCTION
People in the United States strongly support the simple idea that em
ployers should not discriminate against gays and lesbians. In a

2003 Gallup

poll, eighty-eight percent of respondents said that "homosexuals should . . .
1
have equal rights in terms of job opportunities." Even prominent social con
servatives-such as George

W.

Bush-give lip service to the idea that
2

employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is wrong.

But gay rights advocates have achieved only modest legal reform on this
issue. Seventeen states have prohibited employment discrimination against
3
gays and lesbians. A seemingly modest bill, the Employment Non
Discrimination Act (ENDA), which only prohibits disparate treatment on
the basis of sexual orientation, has been introduced several times in Con
4
gress, always without success. ENDA has little chance of passing during
the Bush administration unless midterm elections in 2006 radically change
5
the face of Congress. Civil rights advocates may even abandon ENDA and
I.
GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PuBLIC OPINION 2003, at 162 (2004); see also
Los ANGELES TIMES POLL ALERT: SELECTED RESULTS FROM THE TIMES POLL, GAY ISSUES SURVEY
16 (Mar. 27-30, 2004), http://www.latimesinteractive.com/pdfarchive/nationworld/la-poll041104pdf.pdf (showing that seventy-two percent "favor . . . laws to protect gays against job discrimina
tion").

2. When asked whether he thought that gays and lesbians should have the same rights as
other Americans, Bush said, "Yes. I don't think they ought to have special rights, but I think they
ought to have the same rights." He subsequently denied knowing "the particulars" of the Employ
ment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), and so avoided saying whether or not he would support it,
but did claim to be "the kind of person-I don't hire or fire somebody based upon their sexual orien
tation . . . . I support equal rights but not special rights for people." W hen asked to define "special
rights," Bush said, "Well, it'd be if they're given special protective status." Online NewsHour: The
Second Presidential Debate (Oct. 11, 2000), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/election/2000debates/
2ndebate3.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
3. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12940 (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-8 l c (West
2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (2004); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 511-102 (2006); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, § 4572 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. 49B § 16 (LexisNexis 2005); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. !SIB, § 4 (2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.08 (West 2005); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 613.330 (LexisNexis 2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:7 (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. 10:5-12
(West 2002 & Supp. 2005); N.M. STAT.§ 28-1-7 (2005); N.Y. E XEC. LAW§ 296 (McKinney 2005);
OR. REV. STAT.§ 659A.030 (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 28-5-7 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,§ 495
(2005).
4.

See

infra Part II.

5. President Clinton signed an executive order that prohibited discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in employment within the federal civilian workforce. Exec. Order No. 13,087, 63
Fed. Reg. 30,097 (May 28, 1998). George W. Bush left this executive order intact when he assumed
office. Despite some uncertainty created by the Bush Administration Office of Special Counsel, the
policy of nondiscrimination appears to remain in force. Civilrights.org, Under Pressure, Bush Ap
pointee Restores GLBT Anti-Discrimination Information (Apr. 23, 2004), http://
www.civilrights.org/issues/glbt/details.cfm?id=22558.
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instead promote a broader, omnibus civil rights improvement act, in which
employment rights for gays would presumably play a part.
This Article attempts to extend ENDA rights to individual employees by
another means. The certification mark, a little-known piece of intellectual
property, provides a mechanism for employers to commit to the exact sub
stantive duties of ENDA. We have created a symbol, an FE inside a circle,
that we call the "Fair Employment" mark.

We have formally applied to the United States Patent and Trademark Office
to register this symbol as a certification mark, which we would own.6
The idea behind the Fair Employment mark is simple, really: by entering
into the licensing agreement with us, an employer gains the right (but not
the obligation) to use the mark and in return promises to abide by the word
for-word strictures of ENDA. Displaying the mark signals to knowing con
sumers and employees that the company manufacturing the product or
providing the service has committed itself not to discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation.
Other certification marks (such as the Good Housekeeping Seal and the
Underwriters Laboratory and Orthodox Union marks) require the mark
holder to police licensees to insure compliance with the requirements of the
licensing agreement. But the licensing agreement for the Fair Employment
mark allows employees and applicants to enforce the ENDA duties directly
as express third-party beneficiaries of the agreement.7 The Fair Employment
mark thus replicates the core enforcement mechanism of ENDA by creating
private causes of action in the same class of individuals who would gain
protection under the statute.
The mark represents an incremental strategy in the struggle for equality.
Most importantly, the mark holds out the possibility of extending substan
tive ENDA rights-especially rights to sue for discrimination-to
potentially hundreds of thousands of workers and applicants who are cur
rently uncovered.
But the mark also provides a "demonstration" effect. It provides mem
bers of Congress with information that might quell concerns about whether
they should support ENDA. The mark provides a mechanism for producing
quasi-binding precedent about a statute before the statute is ever enacted.
6. Office of Patents & Trademarks, Certification Mark Application Receipt (Feb. 17, 2005)
(copy on file with author).
7. A draft of the licensing agreement is on file with the authors and is included in the Ap
pendix. See app.

1642
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The mark thus provides legislators with information about the ways a statute
might be interpreted by courts, as well as the rates of litigation the statute
might generate.
Of course, these benefits of the mark will only accrue if employers actu
ally sign the license agreement. Ay, there's the rub. "No employer in her
right mind would volunteer to be a defendant in a lawsuit," our gentle read
ers might reasonably protest. We appreciate this concern and devote a fair
amount of space in this Article to argue that employers could rationally vol
unteer for potential liability.
Of the reasons employers might make themselves vulnerable, the most
important is that "practicing" the mark might induce more sales. The mark
provides another way supporters of gay rights can vote with their wallets,
rewarding progressive policies and institutions. Just as consumers can travel
and spend tourism dollars to support progressive state and local govern
ments, so, too, they can reward companies that treat gay employees fairly,
by purchasing their products and services.
The mark might also help recruit employees and appease other input
suppliers. Some employers might see little downside to signing the license
agreement because their employees already have private rights of action
under state law or local ordinance. Importantly (and at first blush somewhat
paradoxically), some employers might sign to contain discrimination liabil
ity since the licensing agreement mirrors ENDA's limitations on certain
aspects of liability (for example, the 180-day filing requirement and no dis
parate impact liability). Some firms might prefer to make discrimination
liability subject to the specific terms of a contract rather than the expansive
(and general) terms of an employee handbook. Still others may sign just
because it is the right thing to do.
Many, many employers have already included sexual orientation in non
discrimination policies contained in employee handbooks. Employers often
use their nondiscrimination policies to recruit employees and appease cus
tomers, but during litigation some employers argue that an employee
handbook does not constitute a promise not to discriminate. "At will" em
ployment regimes in some states do not recognize employee handbooks as
constraining employers' right to fire for any reason-including an em
ployee's sexual orientation. By signing the license, an employer effectively
waives this possible defense.
The Article is divided into four parts. Part I describes the law of certifi
cation marks and the potential benefits of the Fair Employment mark as a
new type of federalism. Part II digs into the details of the licensing agree
ment and defends the drafting choices that we made in tailoring the duties of
licensees. Part III identifies employers that we predict would sign the
mark-even in the face of potential boycotts and legal liability. Finally, Part
IV takes on concerns about whether adoption of the mark will actually fur
ther the greater goal of equality.

Mark(et)ing Nondiscrimination
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M ARKING NONDISCRIMINATION

Certification marks are used to signal that a product or service bearing
the mark has met a specific standard set forth by the mark's owner, the li
censor. Groups or individuals can register certification marks with the
federal government much as we do trademarks.8 But certification marks are
a distinct type of intellectual property because they are the only piece of IP
that owners cannot "practice" themselves.
A trademark owner must be involved in producing the item or providing
9
the service that bears the mark. A certification mark owner, in contrast,
must remain independent and may not produce any of the goods or services
to which the mark applies. 10 Owners of certification marks cannot use the
mark on any product that they manufacture. Only licensees are allowed to
use the mark. The owner's job is to certify that the licensees conform to re
quirements of the license so that the public can trust the quality or integrity
of the product and its manufacturer. The owner of the mark is prohibited by
law from practicing a self-produced mark, because self-certification is in
herently self-interested.
Certification marks account for a small percentage of intellectual prop
erty. Owners of certification marks are held to high standards of conduct:
decisions about whether to certify a product or service must be based exclu
sively upon the criteria the owner has set for the mark. In other words,
certification cannot be based on a user's willingness to pay a fee to the
owner of the mark (other than a minimal fee covering administrative costs).
In effect, the certifying entity must operate as a nonprofit.
Seen in this light, the Fair Employment mark is a simple and traditional
idea innovatively applied in a new context. Commerce in the United States
has nurtured a venerable tradition of labeling products to improve work
conditions for groups of oppressed people. Trade union labels first came
into circulation as a way of promoting shorter work days. In 1869, the Car
penter's Eight-Hour League of San Francisco created a stamp that permitted
lumber mills to signal that they ran on an eight-hour schedule rather than a
ten-hour schedule.11 This was typical of most union labels that followed,
which were generally used to promote better working conditions and to
12
guard against the use of tenement-house, sweatshop, and prison labor. By

8.

15 U.S.C. § 1054 (2000).

9. Id. § 1064. Licensing a trademark while giving up control of the product would constitute abandonment of the mark under federal trademark law. Id.
id. § 1054.

10.

See id.;

11.

ERNEST R. SPEDDEN, THE TRADE-UNION LABEL 10 n.2 (1910).

12. BUREAU OF lNT'L LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. 0EP'T OF LABOR, BY THE SWEAT AND TOIL OF
CHILDREN: CONSUMER LABELS AND CHILD LABOR 7 (1997), http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/
reports/iclp/sweat4/sweat4.pdf.
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the turn of the century, union labels were used by groups in many indus
13
tries.
Although some early labeling schemes attempted to promote the quality
or healthfulness of the product, the union label stood primarily for "better
14
pay and improved work conditions." For example, even before Congress
enacted legislation outlawing child labor, private organizations devised and
administered labeling programs to promote products manufactured without
1
the use of child labor. Now U.S. consumers are faced with a growing num
ber of products manufactured in countries where employment laws are lax
16
or nonexistent. In response to consumer concerns, many products in the
United States bear marks relating to issues of moral import: environmental
impact, animal testing, fair trade, sweatshops, and child labor. The Fair Em
ployment mark would similarly permit consumers who care about gay rights
to spend their money in ways consistent with their values.
A. Minimalist Certification
Although certification marks enjoy a long tradition, two aspects of the
Fair Employment mark are quite nontraditional. First, we have structured
the licensing agreement to minimize what we must certify as mark owners.
While traditional certification-mark owners go out into the world and moni
tor licensees to make sure they are complying with the requirements of the
mark, we have structured the license agreement so that we can certify with
out inspecting the licensee's employment practices. We do not certify that
the employer does not discriminate. Instead, we certify two crucial things:
The employer has promised not to discriminate in employment on the
basis of sexual orientation.
The employer has granted all of its employees and applicants express
third-party beneficiary status to remedy any breach of the nondiscrimi
nation promise.

Because the licensing agreement expressly includes both of these ele
ments, we can truthfully certify these matters merely by certifying that the
licensee has signed the license. Any employer that signs the licensing
agreement simultaneously gains a right to use the mark and meets the mini
mum requisites for certification. At the same time, the licensee's employees
gain a private right of action to enforce their quasi-ENDA rights.
This minimalist certification structure has three advantages. First, it al
lows a mark owner to provide meaningful certification with virtually no
expense. Even though we do not certify that the employer does not dis13. Id. at 6. These groups included printers, bakers, wood workers, harness makers, iron
molders, broom makers, coopers, photographers, shoemakers, custom tailors, mattress makers,
blacksmiths, brewers, egg inspectors, barbers, and coal distributors.
14.

Id.

at 29.

15.

Id.

at 7-9.

16.

Id.

Mark(et)ing Nondiscrimination
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criminate, we are able to certify that the employer holds itself open to pri
vate suits or other remedial actions for discrimination. To deny that this is
meaningful would be to deny the value of private rights of action under Title
VII and other civil rights laws. Second, this structure is transparent. It makes
clear to employers that we, as mark owners, are not profiting from the mark.
Because of this structure, employers can obtain a license to use the mark
without paying us a licensing fee. Third, this licensing structure allows us to
emulate more closely the ENDA private cause of action. Employers need
not worry that the mark owners will engage in vexatious litigation, because
we do not have a right to sue for violations of the nondiscrimination prom
ise.
B. Third-Party Beneficiaries
The second and related innovation in the structure of the license con
cerns the use of third-party beneficiary rights. In return for the right to use
the mark, an employer expressly grants third-party beneficiary status to the
same parties who could sue to enforce ENDA if it were enacted. Paragraph
5 of the License reads as follows:
THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES. Licensee and Licensor agree to desig
nate as express third-party beneficiaries of this agreement all persons and
entities that would be entitled to sue if ENDA were in effect (including
governmental civil rights enforcement agencies). In particular, Licensee
and Licensor designate as express third-party beneficiaries all persons who
are or have been employed by the Licensee or applied for employment
with the Licensee during the term of the license. The Licensee and Licen
sor intend that these third-party beneficiaries will have the right to sue the
Licensee for any breach of this agreement and have a legal right to the
same remedies (including damages and injunctive relief) to which they
would be entitled if ENDA were in effect. 17

Through this agreement, the mark owner altruistically grants potential
private rights of action to third parties.
While contract promises (including intellectual property licensing
agreements) traditionally require a return element of consideration in order
to be enforceable, it is well settled that express third-party beneficiaries can
acquire enforceable contractual rights without providing consideration
18
themselves. So long as the consideration is provided by another party to
the contract-in this case, by the mark owner in granting the licensee the

17.

See

app. para. 5.

18. 13 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 37:26 (4th ed. 2000) ("The rule
regarding such situations has long been established: 'where one makes a promise to another for the
benefit of a third person, such third person may avail himself of the promise and bring an action
thereon, although the consideration does not move directly from him.'" (quoting Hale v. Ripp, 49
N.W. 218, 219 (Neb. 1891))); see also Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Howard, 162 So. 683, 684 (Ala.
1935) ("[I]f one person makes a promise for the benefit of a third party, such beneficiary may main
tain an action thereon, though the consideration does not move from the latter.").
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right to use the mark-the beneficiaries' right to nondiscrimination is en
19
forceable.
In some cases, a genuine issue can arise about whether the plaintiff is a
legitimate and intended third-party beneficiary of the contract. Courts and
commentators have debated whether third parties can sue when they are
merely unnamed, implicit third-party beneficiaries. But when the signatories
to a contract expressly intend to authorize suit by a well-defined, clearly
20
identified group, then a right of action is much more certain. The precise
identities of individuals within a benefited group need not be known at the
time of the contracting, as long as the agreement makes clear the character
21
istics of the group as a whole. In the case of the mark, the licensing
agreement explicitly makes job applicants and employees of the licensee the
intended third-party beneficiaries of the contract. This is a finite, clearly
defined population, subject to easy verification.
The licensing agreement thus is an example of using third-party benefi
ciary status to link a private contract to a public or social good. W hile this
strategy is rarely deployed, there is no legal impediment to using consumer
contracts, or other agreements, to combine private and public goals. The

Fair Employment licensing agreement grants the right to use the mark, but
only if the licensee agrees to create rights of action in third parties: the li
censee's job applicants and employees.
C.

The Benefits of Privatizing ENDA

Together, the license structure of minimal certification and third-party
altruism allows the Fair Employment mark to effect a privatization of
ENDA. Instead of the mandatory nondiscrimination duties of ENDA, the
mark creates an opt-in mechanism for employers that want to contract af
firmatively for ENDA

duties. Richard Epstein has railed against the
22
but even he

mandatory nature of Title VII and other civil rights duties,

along with all thorough-going libertarians-ought to embrace the

FE mark

as expanding freedom of contract.
The mark also represents a new form of federalism. We traditionally
think of federalism as competition among jurisdictions, with individual

19. Fourth Ocean Putnam Corp. v. Interstate Wrecking Co., 487 N.Y.S.2d 591, 594-95 (App.
Div. 1985) ("It is true that where performance is to be made directly to a third party, there is at least
'a presumption that the contract was for the benefit of the third party.' However, 'the intention of the
promisee is of primary importance, since the promisee procured the promise by furnishing the con
sideration therefor.' " (citations omitted)).
20. 13 LORD, supra note 18, § 37:8 ("[A]s a general rule, a third party may enforce a promise
as having been made for his benefit, if it appears from the promise or in the light of the surrounding
circumstances that he was intended in fact to be a donee beneficiary of the promisee.").
21. Pappas v. Jack 0.A. Nelsen Agency, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 721, 725-26 (Wis. 1978) ("Thus,
the precise identity of the third-party beneficiary need not be ascertainable at the time of the agree
ment so long as the agreement specifies or identifies a group or class to whom the party must belong
to benefit thereby.").
22. RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI
NATION LAWS (1992).
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June 2006]

1647

states acting as the laboratories for legal experimentation. The Fair Em
ployment mark is an example of "corporate federalism," in which individual
business organizations are allowed to experiment with different regulatory
structures. Of course, any regime with freedom of contract allows corporate
experimentation. But the Fair Employment mark allows a type of structured
experimentation. It is thus akin to corporate statutes that give individual
businesses discrete choices, e.g., opting into particular "control transaction"
protections or opting out of certain duties of care. 23
1. Amelioration

If a substantial number of employers signed the license,24 the mark
would provide three different types of incremental benefits: amelioration,
demonstration, and realignment. 25 First, the mark would ameliorate the
problem of orientation discrimination for covered workers. Outside of the
states that expressly provide private causes of action, employees sometimes
have no legal remedy for claims of sexual orientation discrimination in em
ployment. Even employers that include sexual orientation in their
nondiscrimination policy are sometimes found not to have made a binding
promise not to discriminate. 26 The extension of private causes of action to
unprotected workers is not just a symbolic act. It would remedy real harms.
As in the early years of Title VII, there are many examples of blatant dispa
rate treatment in conditions of employment. Even in businesses that
voluntarily adopt the mark and that genuinely oppose discrimination, gay
and lesbian workers may be subject to blatant disparate treatment from
managers or coworkers. 27 The mark provides a means to address these
wrongs.

23.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2001) (opt-out law); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-21110 to -1113, -1131 to -1133 (2003) (opt-in-via bylaw amendment-business combination and

fair price laws). For a complete list of anti-takeover law statutes (most opt-out, a few mandatory, and
only Georgia with opt-in), see PATRICK s. MCGURN & MARY FRANCES SPATOLA, STATE TAKEOVER
LAWS (2d ed. 1995). For director liability statutes, see DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001)
(opt-in regime), and Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (LexisNexis 2004) (opt-out statute).
24.

Part III will predict which employers are most likely to sign the agreement.

We have argued that our "inclusive command" proposal represents another incremental
strategy for providing these three types of benefits with regard to employment discrimination in the
military. See IAN AYRES & JENNIFER GERARDA BROWN, STRAIGHTFORWARD: How TO MOBILIZE
HETEROSEXUAL SUPPORT FOR GAY RIGHTS 116-44 (2005); Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres,
25.

The Inclusive Command: Voluntary Integration of Sexual Minorities into the U.S. Military,

103

MICH. L. REv. 150 (2004).
26.

This enforceability of nondiscrimination policies is discussed infra Part III.A.

27.
See, e.g., EMPIRE STATE PRIDE AGENDA, ANTI-GAY/LESBIAN DISCRIMINATION IN NEW
YORK STATE 1 (2001), http://www.prideagenda.org/pride/survey.pdf ("In New York, anti-gay job
discrimination in employment is pervasive, with more than one-third of the respondents (36%)

experiencing some form of job-related discrimination within the last five years. . . . 8% were fired
because of their sexual orientation. . . . 27% were verbally harassed at the workplace (e.g., being
called names such as 'faggot,' 'dyke,' 'bulldagger,' 'sissy,' 'queer,' or other anti-gay words) . . . . 7%
were physically harassed at the workplace because of their sexual orientation (e.g., being chased,
followed, or threatened with physical violence). . . . 10% were given a negative performance

1648
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2. Demonstration

Second, if the mark succeeds, it will produce a demonstration effect that
could inform Congress and state legislators about the advisability of passing
ENDA or state laws prohibiting discrimination. If 500,000 employees were
covered by the mark, legislators would learn something over time about ex
pected litigation rates and the magnitude of potential liability. Granted, this
litigation information would provide only a lower bound on potential claims
since employers that volunteer for potential liability are less likely to have
discriminatory practices than those that do not. But even this lower bound
information is useful in demonstrating that ENDA would not open a flood
gate of litigation. If in fact the litigation rates and awards are reasonably low
under the mark, 28 it would demonstrate that the form of potential liability
proposed under the statute could be managed-by employees and covered
employers alike.
The inevitable litigation that would arise under the mark would also
provide legislators with information about how courts might interpret
ENDA if it were enacted. The Fair Employment mark allows courts for the
first time to create persuasive precedent about the meaning of statutory lan
guage before the statute is passed.29 At first, this seems impossible-statutes
must be enacted before they can be interpreted. And if it were possible, why
would this be the first time it ever happened? The simple answer is that to
our knowledge the licensing agreement is the first private contract that ex
plicitly adopts the words of a proposed statute in order to put its provisions
30
into effect. As shown in the Appendix, the licensing agreement expressly
states its goal: "WHEREAS Licensee desires to privately commit to non
discrimination as defined in the Employment Non-Discrimination Act
31
th
(ENDA) as proposed in S. 1705, 108 Cong., 1" Sess. (2003)." This verevaluation because of their sexual orientation."); see also Dave Munday, Gay Workers Fear for
Their Jobs; Nondiscrimination Policies Still Scarce,

28.

PosT & COURIER, Apr. 4, 2004,

at E l .

Evidence from the states that have already provided for private rights o f action shows

that the rates of litigation are very low. U.S. GEN. AccouNTING OFFICE, PuBL'N No.

GAO/OGC-987R, SEXUAL-ORIENTATION-BASED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: STATES' EXPERIENCE WITH
STATUTORY PROHIBITIONS (1997) (explaining that in states with statutes making it illegal to dis

criminate in employment on the basis of sexual orientation, relatively few formal complaints or
lawsuits alleging such discrimination had been filed); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PuBL'N No.

GA0/0GC-00-27R, SEXUAL-ORIENTATION-BASED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: STATES' EX
PERIENCE WITH STATUTORY PROHIBITIONS SINCE 1997 (2000) (arguing that both the number of

complaints of sexual orientation discrimination in employment and the percentage of such com
plaints as a portion of overall complaints of employment discrimination filed "may still be
characterized as relatively small;" the number of lawsuits pursuant to these state laws was even
smaller).

29.

Of course, the precedent will not be persuasive in all cases because some canons of con

tract interpretation are inconsistent with canons of statutory interpretation. For instance, although
policy goals will often inform statutory interpretation, public policy implications will usually take a
distant second to party intent when courts construe a contract. And statutes are not generally con

strued against the drafting party.

30.

Much more common is the reference to statutes or other public law in contracts specifi

31.

App. pmbl.

cally designed by parties to opt out of the default.
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sion of the ENDA bill is attached to the license; the substantive "Standards
of Fair Employment" included in the license are taken word-for-word from
the bill. Thus, when a court is asked to interpret the meaning of the words in
the license, it will be interpreting the same words that appear in the pro
posed bill. Even though the court will be interpreting a contractual promise,
the foregoing "whereas" clause will lead the court to ask whether the em
ployer's conduct would have run afoul of ENDA had the bill been enacted.
Information about how courts will interpret ENDA can help quell legis
lative concerns about supporting the bill. Even though the next Section will
show that the bill is a narrow prohibition of disparate treatment alone, legis
lators may still worry that "activist judges" will extend the statute beyond its
borders. Even though the statute does not reach discrimination on the basis
of gender identity and expression, legislators may be concerned that ENDA
will restrict employers' ability to regulate employee appearance and con
duct. Resolving these possible ambiguities can ease the bill's passage-in
part because the legislators can expressly approve or disapprove of such
precedent. Just as Congress expressly disapproved of some Supreme Court
precedent and expressly approved of other precedent when it passed the
Civil Rights Act of 199 1, so too Congress would have the option of explic
itly embracing or rejecting particular court interpretations of the Fair
Employment mark licensing agreement when considering whether to pass
ENDA. The substantive language of the nondiscrimination requirement in a
future proposal of ENDA might even change in response to this precedent.
There are important differences between pre-passage license precedent
and post-passage ENDA precedent. As a formal matter, an interpretation of
contractual language would not be binding on a court interpreting statutory
language in a post-passage case. This is particularly true when different
courts are involved. With the exception of a few federal cases brought under
diversity jurisdiction, the bulk of the license precedent would come from
state courts, while post-passage ENDA interpretations would result from
federal litigation. Federal courts might be reluctant to defer to state court
interpretations of federal statutory language--especially when those inter
pretations had occurred before the federal statute had been passed. Then
again, affirmative references to these state court decisions in the congres
sional record when the statute is subsequently enacted could radically raise
the precedential value of the state court decisions.
The flip side is that congressional action could also render this pre
passage license precedent irrelevant. The language of many bills is signifi
cantly amended before passage. The language of proposed legislation often
changes from year to year as revised bills are introduced in successive legis
lative sessions. Our licensing agreement takes account of this possibility by
allowing us to update the licensing language on an ongoing basis, keeping
32
pace with the legislative state of play.

32. Although we, as owners of the_mark, may not unilaterally modify the license, we intend
to propose modifications to confonn the license to updated versions of the bill that are fonnally
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3. Realignment
Finally, the coverage of a substantial number of employees creates new
legislative opportunities that might serve as a wedge issue to realign politi
cians who currently oppose ENDA. At first, it might seem that ENDA
already represents an irreducible legislative minimum. It is carefully crafted
solely to prohibit disparate treatment. It does not allow disparate-impact
claims or claims for health benefits by unmarried domestic partners. It ex
pressly does not require affirmative action. It would seem that there is not
much left on which gay rights proponents could compromise.

33

The Fair Employment mark, however, illuminates new opportunities for
compromise. These areas of compromise emerge when we consider the in
herent limits on freedom of contract illustrated by the mark. There are some
things parties to a contract cannot effect, and these gaps give Congress a
chance to act. The most important respect in which the licensing agreement
cannot replicate ENDA is the enforcement regime. Under ENDA, the Justice
Department

and

the

Equal

Employment

Opportunity

Commission

(EEOC)-as well as individual employees and applicants-would be em
powered to sue employers that discriminate. The licensing agreement goes
as far as it can in naming as third-party beneficiaries this same set of plain
tiffs: to wit, "all persons and entities that would be entitled to sue if ENDA
34
This is an attempt to grant government actors enforcement

were in effect."

power. Yet while this provision is sufficient consent on the part of the corpo
rate licensee for such enforcement, the government actors need separate
legislative authorization to be able to bring an ENDA-like enforcement ac
tion. Put simply, private parties by themselves cannot give the Justice
Department or the EEOC power to sue-they need congressional action for
that.
However, each licensing agreement could be seen as an invitation to
congressional action. If a million employees were covered by the license,
gay rights advocates might lobby Congress to empower the civil rights
agencies to enforce the nondiscrimination policy against those corporations
that had volunteered. Such an "opt-in" enforcement statute might gamer the
support of legislators who have been reluctant to impose ENDA's require
ments on unwilling companies.
Indeed, it is a short step to see the license agreement not only as a vehi
cle for "opt-in" enforcement, but also as a call for an "opt-in" version of
ENDA itself. Congress might easily displace the need for the mark's con
tractual commitment by passing a statute that makes ENDA duties binding
only on companies that affirmatively opt for the statute-possibly by for-

introduced into Congress. New licensees will opt into the latest version of the ENDA bill (or compa
rable legislation).
33. In fact. ENDA could be pared back on a number of other grounds. For example, class
actions could be prohibited or damages could be more severely capped.
34.

App. para. 5.
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Free-market conservatives simply have

no argument to resist such legislation. Richard Epstein, for example, at
tacked the mandatory nature of Title VII in his

1992 book, Forbidden
36
Grounds. For Epstein, the chief evil of Title VII is that it restricts freedom
of contract. But Epstein should have no problem with a statute that permits

firms to decide whether they want to be covered by civil rights laws.
Indeed, Epstein's criticism of the mandatory nature of Title VII only
suggests that lawmakers should permit firms to contract around the default
set of rights regarding employment discrimination. This kind of criticism
37
tells us nothing about what the appropriate default rule should be. Ep
stein's argument in Forbidden Grounds is a contractual non sequitur. If
Epstein believes that the mandatory nature of a civil rights law is unwar
ranted, he can certainly suggest that legislators make the statutory duty
waivable. Epstein needs a separate kind of argument-which he never pro
38
vides-to show that an opt-in statute is superior to an opt-out statute.
Epstein argues for the repeal of Title VII (implicitly turning it into an opt-in
statute, creating no employment rights unless employers affirmatively con
tract for them), but he does not consider whether an opt-out default would
be superior.
The same opt-in/opt-out debate lies at the end of this ENDA thought ex
periment. Once Congress begins to consider the opt-in version of ENDA
described above, it is natural to ask whether an opt-out version of ENDA
might be even better. Both are formally equivalent from a libertarian free
dom-of-contract perspective because both give employers the identical legal
option to embrace or avoid nondiscrimination duties. But default choice
39
matters. Default inertia is the iron law of contracting. We would undoubt
edly see more employees covered by nondiscrimination promises in the
40
While the Fair Em

shadow of an opt-out statute than an opt-in statute.

ployment mark comes close to replicating the effects of an opt-in statute,
only lawmakers can create an opt-out statute.
Stepping back, we can now see a variety of opportunities for incre
mental legislative progress. While the minimalistic ENDA duties initially

35. Such a statute would have to govern the conditions under which a firm might subse
quently "opt out" of coverage. In the spirit of incrementalism, we believe that this should be allowed
as long as there was sufficient public notice.
36.

EPSTEIN, supra note 22.

37.

See generally

Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
99 YALE L. J. 87 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts]; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian De
faults, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1591 (1999) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian

Economic Theory of Default Rules,

Defaults].

38.

Ian Ayres,

Empire or Residue: Competing Visions of the Contractual Canon, in

LEGAL

CANONS 47, 58 (J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson eds., 2000).

39. Put formally, in equilibrium when rule Xis the default, one would expect to see a higher
proportion of contractors covered by rule X than by any other term. See Ayres & Gertner, Majori
tarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, supra note 37, at 1598.
40.

Ayres, supra note 38, at 58.
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did not appear amenable to statutory compromise, we have identified three
incremental way stations that become visible as a consequence of the Fair
Employment mark. First, Congress might empower the federal civil rights
agencies to enforce the mark's duties against voluntary licensees. Second,
Congress might displace the mark by creating an opt-in ENDA statute. And
most expansively, Congress might create an opt-out ENDA statute allowing
employers to avoid potential liability by publicly disclaiming the statute's
nondiscrimination duties. While the Fair Employment mark goes a long way
toward replicating the rights and responsibilities of the proposed statute,
these final two default statutes would solve both the precedential and en
forcement deficits of the mark. Precedents created under either an opt-in or
opt-out statute would be solid federal precedent in the event of later manda
tory passage of the statute. And these contractible statutes would create the
public enforcement add-on that is currently missing from the licensing
agreement.
II. TAILORING THE COVERAGE OF THE LICENSING AGREEMENT
This Part defends in more detail what is included in and excluded from
our licensing agreement. As for inclusion, we have simply tried to impose as
nearly as possible the legal duties of ENDA, a bill that has been proposed
41
repeatedly since 1993 but has not yet been enacted by Congress. The cen
tral goal of the bill was to grant employees and applicants a private right of
action if they are subject to disparate treatment because of their sexual ori
entation. In effect, ENDA would include sexual orientation in the group of
characteristics that Title VII already makes off-limits as the basis for the
42
terms and conditions of employment. Paragraph 4 of the licensing agree
ment sets out these substantive duties:

STANDARDS OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT. Licensee promises not to en
gage in the following employment practices:
( 1) "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to the compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the individual, be
cause of such individual's sexual orientation;" ENDA, S. 1705, § 4
(a)(l) (attached hereto) or
(2) "to limit, segregate, or classify the employees or applicants for em
ployment of the employer in any way that would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment or otherwise adversely affect the
41.

See

J. Banning Jasiunas, Note,

ls ENDA the Answer? Can a "Separate but Equal" Fed

61 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1529 (2000). In using the language of ENDA, we are placing the words of Chai Feldblum, one
of its principal drafters, into our licensing agreement. See generally Georgetown University, Chai R.
Feldblum, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/curriculum/tab_faculty.cfm?Status=Faculty&Detail=251
(last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
eral Statute Adequately Protect Gays and Lesbians from Employment Discrimination?,

42. Representative Barney Frank, a supporter of ENDA, has stated that ENDA would result
in legal protection "for gay and lesbian people" identical to the protections granted by Title VII.
Jasiunas, supra note 41, at 1545-46.
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status of the individual as an employee, because of such individual's
sexual orientation;" ENDA, S. 1705, § 4 (a)(2) (attached hereto)
(3) to discriminate against any individual because of the sexual orientation
of the individual "in admission to, or employment in, any program es
tablished to provide apprenticeship or other training;" ENDA, S. 1705,
§ 4(d) (attached hereto)
(4) to discriminate against an individual because such individual opposed
any of the employment practices described in subsections (1) through
(3), "or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing"
concerned with this License. ENDA, S. 1705, § 5 (attached hereto)
The employment practices described in any of subsections (I) through (3)
"shall be considered to include an action described in that subsection,
taken against an individual based on the sexual orientation of a person with
whom the individual associates or has associated." ENDA, S. 1705, § 4 (e)
(attached hereto).43
But unlike Title VII, our license follows ENDA in expressly limiting its
coverage to claims of disparate treatment. Like ENDA, the licensing agree
ment expressly disclaims disparate-impact and affirmative-action duties and
does not require employers to provide employee benefits to domestic part44
ners.
In tailoring the coverage of the license, we cleave to the ENDA duties
for several reasons. First, they are clear and simple. The idea of having a
legally enforceable private right of action to be free from disparate treatment
in employment on the basis of an impermissible characteristic resonates
with a core conception of civil rights. By excluding disparate impact cover
age, we make it harder to characterize the license as "a quota bill." By
eschewing any duty of affirmative action, we hope to silence those who
would complain about "special rights."
Moreover, the ENDA duties have become a focal point of debate, draft
ing, and lobbying. The substantive language of our license has been
repeatedly introduced into Congress. Over a hundred corporations have said
45
that they want the bill to be passed. Potential licensees do not need to fly
speck whether they agree with our particular drafting choices. Just as we
disclaim enforcement power to assure potential licensees that we will not be
vexatious litigators, so we disclaim drafting power in choosing the contours

43.

App. para.

44.

See id.

4.

paras. 6 and 7.

45. For the full list of companies, see Human Rights Campaign Foundation, Corporations
and Small Businesses Endorsing the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA),
http://www.hrc.org{femplate.cfm?Section=Endorsing_ENDA&CONTENTID=17977&TEMPLATE
=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
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of licensee duties to assure them that we have not inserted an unduly bur
46
densome or unreasonable requirement.
In keeping with this principle, we have not attempted to reengineer or
improve upon the ENDA duties. Since ENDA would allow class actions, our
47
license would allow class actions. Since ENDA would allow suits for co
48
worker harassment, our license would allow suits for coworker harassment.
But our license would also allow the same employer countermoves to
limit potential liability. Since ENDA would allow arbitration agreements,
our license would as well. Under ENDA (as with Title VII), discrimination
disputes would be arbitrable so long as the arbitration agreement was con
49
scionable. We believe the same standards should generally apply to the
50
licensing agreement, ENDA, and Title VII. The ability to channel employ
ment disputes into arbitration has been important to many employers.
Arbitration can also be a valuable way to manage risk and curtail potential
51
Since ENDA

liability, particularly for employers that are repeat players.

46. The license is thus an example of what Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff have called the
KISS principal-"Keep It Similar, Stupid." The idea is that securing support for an innovation is
often easier when the implementation will be similar to that of a familiar plan; in this way, the po
tential adopter is not overwhelmed with change and can focus on the crucial innovative element. See
IAN AYRES & BARRY NALEBUFF, W HY NoT? How TO USE EVERYDAY INGENUITY TO Sot.VE PROB
LEMS BIG AND SMALL 203-08 (2003).
47. Section 12(b) of ENDA states that "[t]he procedures and remedies applicable to a claim
alleged by an individual for a violation of this Act are . . . the procedures and remedies applicable
for a violation of [T]itle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.)." H.R. 3285,
108th Cong. § I 2(b) (2003). Courts have long held that class actions are available and, indeed, often
necessary in Title VII cases. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (197 1 ) ("Con
gress provided, in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1 964, for class actions for enforcement of
provisions of the Act."); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970) (de
ciding that the court would construe Title VII to allow for class actions "to make sure that the Act
works"); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 34 (5th Cir. 1968) ("[l]f class-wide relief were
not afforded . . . the result would be the incongruous one of the Court . . . itself being the instrument
of racial discrimination . . . ."); Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 25 1 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1 966)
("Racial discrimination is by definition a class discrimination.").
48. An employer may be liable for coworker harassment under Title VII if the employer's
negligence creates a "hostile work environment." Ocheltree v. Scollon Productions, Inc., 335 F.3d
325, 330-32, 334 (4th Cir. 2003) ("An employer cannot avoid Title VII liability for coworker har
assment by adopting a 'see no evil, hear no evil' strategy.").
49. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 1 05 (2001) (holding that a contract
requiring arbitration of all employment disputes is enforceable under federal law), remanded to 279
F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that ordinary principles of state contract law determine validity of
agreement to arbitrate and, because arbitration agreement was both procedurally and substantively
unconscionable under California law, it was unenforceable), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1112 (2002).
50. Arguably, since the licensing agreement does not include an arbitration clause, job appli
cants would be free to litigate claims arising from it. Even employees who signed employment
contracts containing arbitration clauses might be able to litigate violations of the employment mark,
qua third-party beneficiaries of the licensing agreement. The scope of the arbitration clause within
the employment contract could be broad enough, however, to include the licensing agreement, since
a violation of the licensing agreement would certainly "arise out of or relate to" the contract of
employment.
51. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTs . &
EMP. PoL Y J. 189, 209 (1997) (arguing that employees lose more often, and arbitrators award dam
'

ages to employees less frequently and in lower amounts, when the employer is a repeat player); Lisa
B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of
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would allow waiver of class action rights, so would our license.

52

And fi

nally, since ENDA would require filing of claims within 180 days of the
53
occurrence of a violation, so would our license.
Our meta-goal is to come as close as possible to ENDA rights and re
sponsibilities without ever going beyond them (that is,

without ever

imposing more duties on employers than would be imposed by the statute).
We have already discussed a couple of dimensions in which our license falls
short of ENDA: it does not grant civil rights agencies an independent ability
to enforce, and it cannot create federal court jurisdiction to hear claims aris
54
ing under our license. Our license may also fall short of ENDA with regard
55
to certain remedies. Private parties may not contract for punitive damages.
Thus, even if punitive damages would be available to plaintiffs under
ENDA, courts may be unwilling to grant them to plaintiffs for breach of the
licensing agreement. Similar logic may restrict courts' willingness to grant
certain types of injunctive relief. Specific enforcement of promises is at
times restricted by a variety of doctrines (such as the irreparable-harm rule)
56
that are not at play in remedying statutory civil rights claims. These

29 McGEORGE L. REV. 223, 234 ( 1 998) (noting that in repeat
player cases, employees recover only eleven percent of what they demand, but in cases against em
ployers that are not repeat players, they recover about forty-eight percent of what they demand).

Employment Arbitration Awards,

52.
Many arbitration agreements do not provide for class actions. As long as the arbitration
agreement is not found to be unconscionable, waivers of class action rights will be upheld. See, e.g.,
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 ( 1 99 1 ) (upholding waiver of class action
rights in arbitration of claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Livingston
v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2003) (enforcing an arbitration agreement prohibiting
class actions of claims arising under Truth in Lending Act); Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 244
F.3d 8 14, 8 1 7- 1 8 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2001 ) (same); Johnson v. W. Suburban B ank, 225 F.3d 366, 377-78 (3d
Cir. 2000) (same), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1 145 (200 1). But see Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328
F.3d 1 1 65, 1 1 72-73 (9th Cir. 2003) (striking down arbitration agreement for unconscionability in
part due to its prohibition of class actions).
53. See app. para. 1 4 ("Any lawsuit by a third-party beneficiary for violation of the Standards
of Fair Employment shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged violating
employment practice occurred."). Section 1 2(b) of ENDA ordains that "[t]he procedures and reme
dies applicable to a claim alleged by an individual for a violation of this Act are . . . the procedures
and remedies applicable for a violation of [T]itle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1 964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e et seq.)." See H.R. 3285, 1 08th Cong. § 1 2(b) (2003). And 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)( l ) states
that charges of unlawful discrimination must be filed with the EEOC within 1 80 days of the occur
rence. There is one dimension in which our license arguably goes beyond ENDA. ENDA would
require private plaintiffs to file a charge with the EEOC and obtain a "right to sue" letter before
suing in federal court. (A similar duty to file with the state human rights commission is in place in
California under its state nondiscrimination statute). Plaintiffs under our license would not need to
exhaust this administrative remedy before filing suit. Although this might impose fewer procedural
burdens on license-based plaintiffs, it is important to remember that exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not substantively burden plaintiffs because plaintiffs in any case retain a right to sue.
Therefore the substantive effects of ENDA/Title VII and the license agreement should be the same.
54.
But as discussed supra Section I.C.3, Congress could empower these agencies to enforce
the license against licensees and to allow enforcement by private or public plaintiffs in federal court.
55. Punitive damages can arise out of bad faith conduct or promissory fraud. See generally
IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED INTENT
(2005).
56. See Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687
( 1 990). The trend seems to be toward enforcement of specific performance clauses. See U.C.C. § 2-
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shortfalls from ENDA point out the limits of contracting. But at the end of
the day, the license comes reasonably close to recreating the statutory du
ties, and the license's deviations from ENDA (especially the restriction on
punitive damages) should assuage employer fears about signing on to unlim
ited liability.
We have also intentionally granted licensees the power to change their
minds. While the term of the license is five years (and by default automati
cally renews), we allow licensees to terminate the agreement at any time and
for any reason. In contrast, we as licensors ·can terminate the agreement
prior to the term of the agreement only for cause-that is, if the licensee
violates the standard for Fair Employment. This asymmetry in termination
rights is intended to assure licensees in yet another way that they have sub
stantial control over their fate if their perceived liability or other risk
exceeds their expectations.
Although the minimalism and focal nature of our license duties have
considerable appeal, some readers might protest that we have set the bar too
low. While ENDA clearly represents a major advance in employment pro
tections for gay men and lesbians, the bill's proponents in Congress have
had to limit its reach in order to make it more politically palatable. The stat
ute has an understandably modest goal. But as applied to the license, is this
goal too modest? Considering that the license is a voluntary choice of em
ployers (who in part are seeking a marketing advantage), should the license
duties be expanded to secure more than a simple promise not to discriminate?
In the remainder of this Part, we explore five potential expansions in
coverage. The first four concern substantive licensor duties related to gender
identity and expression, healthcare coverage for employees' same-sex do
57

mestic partners, the Human Rights Campaign Corporate Equality Index,

and affiliate corporations (concerning alternative enforcement options). As
important and helpful as all of these potential expansions might be, in the
end, we believe it is useful to retain a license that mirrors the language of
ENDA as formally proposed in Congress. The good news is that in this
world of corporate voluntarism, we need not make either/or decisions. The
Fair Employment mark is entirely consistent with these more ambitious ap
proaches to LGBT employment protection. Corporations are contractually
free to embrace both our ENDA-based Fair Employment mark as well as
additional obligations to their employees.

7 1 6 cmt. 1 ( 1 999) ("[T]his Article seeks to further a more liberal attitude than some courts have
shown in connection with the specific performance of contracts of sale.").
57. The Human Rights Campaign (HRC) is America's largest gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender civil-rights organization. HRC lobbies Congress, mobilizes grassroots action in diverse
communities, invests strategically in congressional campaigns, and increases public understanding
through education and communication. See Human Rights Campaign Foundation, About the Human
Rights Campaign: Our Mission Statement, http://www.hrc.org!femplate.cfm?Section=About_HRC
(last visited Jan. 25, 2006).
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Gender Identity and Expression

Probably the most troubling drafting choice we made concerns gender
identity. By excluding gender identity and gender expression from protected
status, our licensing agreement follows the contours of every version of
ENDA that has been introduced in Congress to date. This means that trans
58
gender employees would not be covered. In the view of ENDA's chief
congressional sponsors, including gender identity or expression in the bill
59
would effectively make it impossible to enact.
Gender identity illustrates well the difficult choices that an incremental
approach requires. Is it ever appropriate to secure gains for only some? Is it
moral to jettison the

T in the LGBT community? Our license, like ENDA,

sacrifices the interests of transgendered people-leaving them out of the
calculus-in its attempt to secure a basic civil right for gay, lesbian, and
60
bisexual employees. The idea of incrementalism works on the assumption
(or, at least, the hope) that fair treatment on the basis of sexual orientation is
a step in the right direction, a step that brings us closer to fair treatment on
the basis of gender identity at some point in the not-too-distant future. Such
pragmatic choices, though difficult, are not unique to this issue. Civil rights
advocates have constantly struggled with the question of when and whether
61
to push for "half a loaf."

58.
Transgender is a broad term to cover a variety of gender identities; the term can refer to
cross-dressers, pre- and post-op transsexuals, inter-sexed people (those born with ambiguous genita
lia, or both male and female sex characteristics), and bi-gendered people (who feel comfortable in
both male and female identities). When gender identity or expression is omitted from employment
protection, employers can use behavior or characteristics that are gender nonconforming as the basis
for disparate treatment.
59.

Adrian Brune, HRC Vows No ENDA if No Trans P rotection: Dramatic Policy Shift Fol
Lobbying Effon, WASH. BLADE, Aug.
1 3, 2004, available at http://
www.washingtonblade.com/2004/8- 1 3/news/national/enda.cfm (quoting Winnie Stachelberg, Hu
man Rights Campaign's political director, as saying in 2003, "Now is not the time to add gender
identity to ENDA. I listen to members of Congress and many of them-not all of them, but many
have said adding [transgender protections] will slow passage of this bill down."); Roslyn Manley,
New "Unified" Bill to Replace ENDA, http://www.tgcrossroads.org/news/archive.asp?aid=740 (last
visited Jan. 8, 2006) (quoting Barney Frank as saying, "Maybe [adding protections for gender
identity or expression] won't cause any loss of support. Maybe it's an easy inclusion. This is what
we have to check and see . . . . Connecticut Republican Christopher Shays, one of ENDA's lead
sponsors, has already signaled that he will drop off the bill if gender rights language is added.").
lows

P rotests,

60. We should note, however, that even putting aside the interests of transgender employees,
some have argued that gay, lesbian, and bisexual employees need gender identity and expression in
ENDA to gain full protection. To the extent that gay, lesbian, and bisexual employees exhibit char
acteristics or behavior that do not conform to gender stereotypes or expectations, employers would
be able legally to subject them to disparate treatment on a basis separate from sexual orientation.
Because sexual orientation and other aspects of gender can be difficult to disentangle, some argue,
gender identity and expression protection is necessary in order to give gay, lesbian, and bisexual
employees full protection. See Cheryl Jacques, Putting the ' T ' into ENDA: HRC 's Board Has De
cided Not to Support ENDA Without Transgender Protections, WASH. B LADE, Aug. 1 3 , 2004,
available at http://www.washingtonblade.com/2004/8-1 3/view/columns/putting.cfm.
6 1 . In Connecticut in 2005, for example, marriage equality advocates had to make tough
choices about whether to support a bill that granted civil-union but not full-marriage rights to same
sex couples. If, as German-Prussian politician Otto Von Bismarck once remarked, "politics is the art
of the possible," such compromises can be justified as ways of doing what is "possible" as soon as
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In the past, the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) has been the primary
gay-rights lobbying group supporting ENDA as proposed, despite HRC's
general position that gender identity also deserves protection. But HRC has
more recently moved toward inclusion. In the summer of

2004, HRC an

nounced that it would not support any version of ENDA that excluded
62
gender identity.
While reasonable people of good faith can differ on this difficult issue,
we cleave to the existing exclusion of gender identity in ENDA solely for
pragmatic reasons. Barney Frank says that he has always wanted trans
gender protection in ENDA; nonetheless, he says,

Civil rights bills have never passed as all or nothing . . . . You go in steps.
The first civil rights bills didn't include voting or housing, but that didn't
stop us from trying to get them passed. Every time you pass a partial civil
63
rights bill you reduce the fears you will run into for the next version.
Gender identity has been excluded from every version of ENDA intro
duced in Congress because sponsors believe that including gender identity
would doom such a bill to defeat. For many employers, inclusion of gender
identity in the company's written nondiscrimination policy would be seen as
too radical a move to be attempted, and they would opt out of using the
mark despite their willingness to include sexual orientation in the policy.
64
Just as the anxiety of the shower has driven military discrimination, it is
our sense that a certain anxiety of the restroom (as in, "which bathroom will
he/she use?") has fueled the reaction to coverage of gender identity. Only 58
of the 379 companies rated in HRC's Corporate Equality Index survey made
reference to gender identity characteristics or expression in their primary
65
nondiscrimination statements. However, things may continue to change
and change quickly. Our intention is to conform the license to the poten
tially evolving language of ENDA as reflected in legislation embraced by
major congressional cosponsors. As long as Barney Frank favors its exclu
sion, we are likely to as well-but not without regret.

possible. Mark Pazniokas, Just One Hitch Before OK, House Adds 'Marriage ' Definition, HARTFORD
CouRANT, Apr. 14, 2005, at A. I .
62.
See Brune, supra note 59. Compare Press Release, AFL-CIO, Employment Non
Discrimination Act (ENDA) (June 24, 1 999), http://www.aflcio.org/mediacenter/prsptm/
pr0624a l999.cfm ("[T]he AFL-CIO strongly urges Congress to pass the 'Employment Non
Discrimination Act (ENDA).' ") with Jeremy B ishop, An Injury To One Is An Injury To All, Trans
Rights (Aug. 5, 2004), http://prideatwork.org/public/documents/press/2004/An%20Injury%20To%
200ne%20Is%20An%20Injury%20To%20All,%20Trans%20Rights.pdf (arguing that the labor
movement must require transgender protections in any employment discrimination legislation it
supports).
63.

Stefen Styrsky, Decision Day on Trans Rights: Human Rights Campaign Board Meets
for Trans-inclusive Legislation, GAY CITY NEWS, Aug. 5, 2004,
http://www.gaycitynews.com/gcn_332/decisiondayontrans.html.

Amidst Growing Demand

64.

See Kendall Thomas, Shower/Closet,

20 ASSEMBLAGE 80 ( 1 993).

See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX: ON GAY,
65.
LESBIAN, BISEXUAL AND ThANSGENDER SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 1 4 (2004), http://www.hrc.org
(follow "Publications" hyperlink; then follow "Corporate Equality Index" hyperlink; then follow
"2004 Corporate Equality Index" hyperlink).
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B. Healthcare Coverage
Another dimension in which the license could be more ambitious, and
go beyond ENDA, concerns healthcare coverage. The license could also
mandate the provision of healthcare and other benefits for employees' same
sex domestic partners. 66 The mark might require this as a way of responding
to the state's own discrimination in denying marriage to same-sex couples.
In jurisdictions where same-sex couples cannot signal their commitment
through civil marriage, they are unfairly harmed by employment policies
that condition certain benefits upon civil marriage.
Employers that refuse to extend health benefits in this way could argue
that they are treating all employees equally: gay or straight, employees re
ceive family health benefits, but only if they are married. But such a
response misses the point. This is not a case in which the harm arises from
treating similarly-situated people differently. Instead, the harm results from
treating differently-situated people the same, without regard for the back
ground conditions of inequality that cause this treatment to affect them in
different ways.
The trouble is that an employment policy extending health benefits to
same-sex but not different-sex domestic partners could be seen as discrimi
nating against heterosexuals, thus violating the nondiscrimination policy
that forbids discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. To mandate
health benefits only for employees' same-sex domestic partners could be
seen as a form of affirmative action-which would be inconsistent with
ENDA and could allow critics to attack the license as granting gay and les
bian workers "special rights."
To avoid this reverse disparate treatment, the Fair Employment mark
could require licensees to offer health benefits to employees' domestic part
ners, regardless of gender. Many companies have voluntarily achieved this
standard already. Whether out of a corporate ethic of fairness to all employ
ees, or out of a recognition that gay men and lesbians can be valuable
employees worth recruiting, more and more companies are including do
mestic partners in employee benefits packages. In fact, recent studies show
that more than 4000 U.S. companies offer their employees domestic-partner
67
health benefits, including nearly half of the Fortune 500 companies. Thus,
nothing in the license would prohibit an employer from doing what thou66. Some employers might also want to make these benefits available to employees' differ
ent-sex domestic partners, but in our view, an employer's decision not to cover different-sex
domestic partners should not preclude use of the Fair Employment mark. Because different-sex
couples have the option of marrying and thereby gaining employment benefits, while same-sex
couples cannot (except in Massachusetts), it seems fair to include unmarried same-sex couples, but
not unmarried different-sex couples in the benefits package. If the employer operates in a state that
extends equal marriage rights to same-sex couples, the need for domestic partner benefits might
similarly dissipate; discriminating on the basis of marital status need not have a disparate impact on
gay people.
67. DARYL HERRSCHAFT & KIM I. MILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, THE
STATE OF THE WORKPLACE FOR LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND ThANSGENDER AMERICANS 2003
(2004), http://www.hrc.org (follow "Publications" hyperlink; then follow "State of the Workplace"
hyperlink; then follow "State of the Workplace © 2003" hyperlink).
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sands of companies are already doing-granting all employees domestic
partner benefits. But to keep the mark's message focused on the most undis
putable measure of equality, we have structured the license to retain ENDA's
clarity. Paragraph 7 of the license expressly provides that the agreement
"shall not be construed to require the provision of employee benefits to an
individual for the benefit of the domestic partner of such individual."
C.

More Expansive Measures of Gay Friendliness

Some readers might be thinking, "businesses already have a mark to
signal employment policies that are fair to LGBT workers: the Human
Rights Campaign Corporate Equality Index 1 00% mark." True enough.
Since 2002, HRC has been administering the Corporate Equality Index
(CEI), a 1 00-point system that rates corporate policies and actions toward
68
the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community. The CEI rates the
Fortune 500 based upon the extent to which they:

"Bar" discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in their primary
written nondiscrimination policy.
Include the words "gender identity" or "gender identity and/or expres
sion" in their primary written nondiscrimination policy.
Offer health insurance coverage to employees' same-sex domestic
partners firm-wide; or provide cash compensation to employees to
purchase health insurance for a domestic partner on their own.
Officially recognize and support a gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender employee resource group; or would support employees'
forming a GLBT employee-resource group, if some expressed interest,
by providing space and other resources; or have a firm-wide diversity
council or working group whose mission specifically includes GLBT
diversity.
Offer diversity training that includes sexual orientation and/or gender
identity and expression in the workplace.
Engage in respectful and appropriate marketing to the gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transgender community and/or provide support through
their corporate foundation or otherwise to GLBT health, educational,
political, or community organizations or events.
Engage in corporate action that would undermine the goal of equal
rights for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people.69

68.
Among its many advocacy activities on behalf of LGBT citizens, HRC administers the
Corporate Equality Index through the Human Rights Campaign Foundation. See Human Rights
Campaign Foundation, Corporate Equality Index, http://www.hrc.org (follow "Publications" hyper
link; then follow "Corporate Equality Index" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).

HRC acquired "glvlndex" in 2001 and subsequently renamed it the HRC Corporate
69.
Equality Index survey. See Human Rights Campaign Foundation, CEI Non-Responders,
http://www.hrc.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Work_Life/Get_Informed2/Corporate_Equality_Index
/Non_Responders/CEI_Non-Responders.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
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HRC uses its criteria to rate the companies on a 1 00-point scale, so that
a company can achieve a relatively high score even if it cannot certify that it
complies with all of the seven standards. Companies that achieve a score of
1 00% can use a "Corporate Equality Index 1 00 Percent" service mark on
their products. Several companies, including American Airlines, Ford Mo
tors, and PepsiCo, are HRC-mark licensees.
The Corporate Equality Index is an important and powerful measure of
corporate responsibility to the LGBT community and its allies. The CEI has
helped to move us to a point at which more than ninety-two percent of the
Fortune 500 give their employees protection against sexual orientation dis
70
crimination. But in some important ways, the CEI is distinct from the Fair
Employment mark.
The HRC 1 00% mark is both more and less ambitious than the Fair Em
ployment mark. It is less ambitious because it does not legally prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientaticn. The HRC mark requires
the employer to include sexual orientation in its nondiscrimination policy,
but in many jurisdictions these policies do not constitute legally binding
promises-especially with regard to applicants who are never hired (and
71
In these jurisdictions, a nondis

therefore not in privity with the employer).

crimination policy is "cheap talk" because employees and third parties gain
no means to enforce violations of the policy. By transforming such policies
into promises, the Fair Employment mark has enforcement "teeth" that the
HRC 1 00% mark may lack, at least in some j urisdictions.
It is important to note, however, that even if the CEI does not by its
terms ensure the level of ex ante protection guaranteed by the Fair Employ
ment mark, the HRC does engage in quite vigorous ex post policing of the
CEI. Teams of researchers at HRC scour litigation databases looking for
actions involving employment discrimination by survey respondents. HRC
then analyzes the firms' actions and positions in litigation to determine
whether the firms are treating the cases with sufficient seriousness. This
follow-up by HRC gives the survey respondents' nondiscrimination policies
greater credibility. If an employer sought to defend allegations of employ
ment discrimination on the ground that the "at-will" employment doctrine
permitted its discriminatory action, HRC would respond with a lower CEI
score the following year. The Fair Employment mark would reinforce this
trend by giving additional, ex ante contractual teeth to firms' representa
tions. When a firm violates its policy, HRC can punish it after the fact by
lowering its CEI score, but if that same behavior breaks a Fair Employment
mark promise, the victim can sue.

70. Equality Forum, Fortune 500 Nondiscrimination Project, http://www.equalityforum.org/
fortune500/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2005) (showing that 92.2 percent of the Fortune 500 give protection
from sexual orientation discrimination in employment; site shows compliant and noncompliant
firms by state and sector of the economy).
7 1 . It still might be plausible to argue that an applicant entered into a preemployment con
tract-in exchange for the applicant's applying, the employer implicitly or explicitly promised not
to discriminate.
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100% mark is more demanding than the Fair

Employment mark. The CEI measures protection for gender identity and
expression (omitted from the Fair Employment mark). The CEI also rewards
the provision of domestic partner health benefits and encourages a variety of
activities to support LGBT workers.
As noted above, there is no structural factor requiring an employer to
choose either the CEI mark or the Fair Employment mark. The two marks
move in consistent directions. It might be appropriate to have more than one
mark to allow employers to signal different qualities. For the companies that
work most progressively to ensure fairness to LGBT workers, the CEI repre
sents a gold standard for corporate policymaking. But in a commercial
environment where consumers and potential employees must sift through
complex and sometimes conflicting information about companies and prod
ucts, we do think there is some virtue in the Fair Employment mark's
simplicity.

72
That simplicity achieves distinct and valuable signaling, even in

a world with the CEI. The Fair Employment mark is intentionally structured
so that the public need not trust our bona tides or vigor in auditing compli
ance. The mark empowers employees and applicants to vindicate a clear
wrong: discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
A specific criterion on the CEI scale that might cause concern is the one
measuring the company's support for an LGBT employee group. The CEI
survey makes clear that an employer can "support" an LGBT employee
group in a variety of ways: by certifying that such a group exists and provid
ing one contact person involved in the group, by funding the group's
activities, or by providing meeting space. Some employers may be too small
to support such a group, lacking a critical mass of openly LGBT employees.
The CEI standards recognize this fact when they provide, as an alternative to
support for an LGBT employee group, that a company could establish a sen
ior level diversity council. Even the smallest company could fulfill this
requirement.
Note, however, that the requirement of an LGBT employee group goes
beyond the command of equality. It does more than place sexual orientation
on par with race and gender in employment protections. LGBT employee
groups and diversity councils are forms of affirmative action, as they repre
sent affirmative steps to recruit and retain LGBT employees and make the
workplace more comfortable for them. Our point is not to accept the equa
tion of affirmative action with other forms of discrimination, but only to
suggest that any requirement vulnerable to the "special rights" canard may
weaken the mark's signal, at least for some consumers. A nondiscrimination
requirement should never be removed, but remedial affirmative action and
other forms of outreach might appropriately be subject to an ultimate sunset.

72. Our conclusion is tempered by our presumption of qualified deference to HRC, a highly
credible and effective gay rights advocacy organization. In Straightforward, we suggest that individ
ual supporters of gay rights-especially heterosexuals-should give qualified deference to gay
rights organizations. See AYRES & BROWN, supra note 25, at 1 89-92 (2005). The Human Rights
Campaign has done and continues to do heroic work in the struggle for equal employment rights.
Our first inclination is to defer to their views on these matters.
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The CEI requirement of charitable contributions to LGBT organizations,
sponsorship of LGBT events, or advertisements in LGBT publications might
similarly draw the "special rights" criticism from some consumers and third
parties. The financial factor could even strain the public's trust of HRC, be
cause if contributions to HRC itself can satisfy this requirement, then HRC
73
as an organization would become self-interested in the transaction.
We have no reason to believe that HRC has acted in a self-interested
manner in administering the CEI. Indeed, given the hostility that often meets
initiatives promoting fairness for LGBT people, we find it necessary to
make clear that our proposal should not be read as a criticism of HRC or the
CEI. HRC has done great work in securing employment protections for
LGBT workers. We stress the differences between the CEI and the Fair
Employment mark only to demonstrate the distinct features of the mark.
The Fair Employment mark is designed to steer clear of any criticisms
related to "special rights" or self-dealing. Since we do not collect a licensing
fee, licensees and the public need not worry about whether we will be op
portunistic with regard to certification or litigation. We certify only that a
licensee has signed the license, and then we retire from the scene. There is
no hint or possibility of personal profit, and thus our mark avoids the ap
pearance of self-dealing.
We have considered whether the Fair Employment mark ought to incor
porate a scoring system similar to the CEL It would be possible to devise a
mark that includes a numeral signaling the company's rating on an index
similar to the CEI. Thus, for example, cereals made by General Mills might
bear a label reading "FE=9," while cereals made by Kellogg would rate only
74
"FE=7." This difference might provide some consumers a reason to buy
Cheerios rather than Rice Krispies. But the example of General Mills and
Kellogg suggests a reason

not to combine the mark with a numerical rating.
"7" may be insufficiently transparent to

The difference between a "9" and a

convey this difference to consumers.
For pragmatic reasons, we reject these varying signals. Consumers
would not only have difficulty understanding a ratings system, but they
73.
The Rev. Jesse Jackson and his civil rights organization, the Rainbow/PUSH Coalition,
have been subject to this sort of critique. Some observers have accused them of giving companies
charged with racial discrimination a sort of absolution in exchange for large donations to PUSH. See
generally KENNETH TIMMERMAN, SHAKEDOWN: EXPOSING THE REAL JESSE JACKSON (2003); Marc
Morano, PUSH Comes to Shove: Jesse Jackson 's Empire Crumbles, CNSNEWS.COM, Jan. 1 5 , 2002,
available at http://www. newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/l / l 4/ 1 70935. shtml.
74.
General Mills could boast its higher Fair Employment rating because it has included
sexual orientation in its nondiscrimination policy, offers domestic partner health insurance benefits,
and has an LGBT Employee Group. These three factors-a nondiscrimination policy that covers
sexual orientation, health benefits for domestic partners, and an LGBT employee group-are the
easiest, most objective criteria to monitor, and General Mills has fulfilled all of them. Kellogg, on
the other hand, offers only spotty domestic partner health benefits, which suppresses its score. See
Human Rights Campaign Foundation, Profile: General Mills Inc., http://www.hrc.org/
Template.cfm?Section=Search_the_Database&Template=/CustomSource/WorkNet/srch_dtl.cfm&
srchtype=QS&searchid= l &orgid= l 244 (last visited Apr. 20, 2005); Human Rights Campaign Foun
dation, Profile: Kellogg Co., http:www.hrc.org/Template/cfm?Section=Search_the_Database&
-QS&searched= I &orgid= 1 47 1 (last visited
Template=ICustomSource/WorkNet/srch_dtl.cfm&srchtypeJan. 29, 2006).
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might also not equally endorse the varied commands of the CEI program.
Instead, we have chosen-at least initially-to have a much simpler and
limited coverage that is targeted at eradicating the core wrong, intentional
disparate treatment on the basis of sexual orientation. To this end, we pro
pose that the mark should be licensed only to companies that privately
promise not to violate the ENDA commands of nondiscrimination.
One way to resolve the differences between the CEI approach and ours
is through a kind of harmonization. HRC has already announced plans to
update its index criteria in

2006. It will give increased weight to equal bene

fits, workplace policies for transgender employees, and diversity training.
The simplest way to harmonize the CEI and the Fair Employment mark
would be for HRC, as part of these updates, to make its criteria legally bind
75
By changing just two words, HRC might accomplish the major goal of

ing.

the Fair Employment mark-granting employees private causes of action.
All it would need to do is measure the extent to which the companies "bar
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation by including the
words ' sexual orientation' in

their priHutry ·.vritten legally binding nondis

crimination or EEO policy." This change would substantially undercut the
76
need for a separate Fair Employment mark.
Harmonization is a two way street. It would also be possible for the Fair
Employment mark to evolve so that it follows the contours of the HRC mark
more closely. While our initial license only commits companies to the non
discrimination mandates of ENDA, subsequent editions of the mark might
encompass more far-reaching goals. For example, once ENDA is enacted,
the license would be wholly redundant with the mandated federal right. At
that point in time, it might be appropriate to require that licensees provide
domestic-partnership benefits (at least to same-sex partners, who are denied
the option to marry civilly). Alternatively, it might be appropriate to add
gender identity and expression to the covered protections. In the spirit of
77
we endorse the possi

incrementalism that informs much of our thinking,

bility of evolving rights. But we should be careful not to impose an ever-

75. The same point could be made about another recent HRC innovation: the Congressional
Non-Discrimination Pledge. HRC, along with the Gender Public Advocacy Coalition and other allied
organizations, has secured "commitments from members of Congress not to discriminate based on
sexual orientation and gender identity and expression in their personal offices." Human Rights Cam
paign Foundation, Members of 108th Congress With Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
and Expression Inclusive Non-Discrimination Pledges, http://www.hrc.org/Content/NavigationMenu/
HRC/Get_Informed/Issues/Workplace_Discrimination/Background_Information4/Pledge_Project.htm
(last visited Apr. 22, 2005) (emphasis added). To make the pledge, members of Congress must sign the
following statement: 'The sexual orientation and gender identity or expression of an individual is not a
consideration in the hiring, promoting or terminating of an employee in my office." Id. We are thrilled
to see that 2 1 Senators and 1 24 Representatives ( 1 5 Republicans, 1 28 Democrats) have signed the
pledge. Id. Again, however, we worry that "statements" and "commitments" fall short of enforceable
promises. The symbolic value is great, but for an LGBT employee who actually suffers discrimination,
the pledge may prove toothless.
76.
The only question would be whether the additional "special rights" features chilled ac
ceptance to the point where it might be worthwhile to have a separate mark that solely prohibited
discrimination.
77.

See AYRES

& BROWN, supra note 25, at 84.
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escalating set of duties on employers. Corporations will be chary of the
mark if they can predict that it will become increasingly burdensome (be
cause there will be costs in adverse publicity if in the future they choose to
discontinue their use of the mark). HRC appears to recognize the impor
tance of such stability. In the

2005 survey, they gave firms explicit, written
2006.

notice of changes scheduled to take effect in
D.

Covering Affiliate Corporations

Finally, it might be appropriate to require users of the mark to certify
that affiliated corporations-particularly major suppliers-have also agreed
to be bound by the nondiscrimination mandate of the mark. Other labeling
schemes have dealt more rigorously than our license has with the problem
of suppliers. For example, the "leaping bunny" mark of the Coalition for
Consumer Information on Cosmetics (CCIC) certifies that both the manu
facturer

and the ingredient suppliers for marked cosmetics and household

products do not perform tests on animals.

78

In order to ensure a critical level of participation, we have crafted the
Fair Employment license only to apply to the licensee's own employment
practices. Again, this mimics the coverage of ENDA itself, because corpora
tions are not responsible for discriminatory practices of their suppliers. Of
course, one danger of this is that an essentially empty "gay friendly" shell
could be devised to bear the label, while the entire manufacturing process is
conducted by companies that discriminate against gay, lesbian, and bisexual
employees. But we find it unlikely that corporate forms will be manipulated
because of the possibility of disparate-treatment liability, and we are reluc
tant to require an adopting company to enforce nondiscrimination up the
supply chain (at least in the first iteration of the mark).
E.

Group Enforcement

The potential victims of discrimination are the most obvious group of
enforcers. The certification license expressly empowers this group by nam
ing the corporation's employees and applicants as third-party beneficiaries
and clothing them with the same kind of private action rights they would
have under ENDA: ''The Licensee and Licensor intend that these third-party
beneficiaries will have the right to sue the Licensee for any breach of this
agreement and have a legal right to the same remedies (including damages
and injunctive relief) to which they would be entitled if ENDA were in ef
fect." Gay and lesbian employees will have the strongest incentives to police
the licensee's conduct, and the cheapest access to information regarding
violations. Therefore, using the licensing agreement to create rights of ac
tion in the employees-who are, after all, the intended beneficiaries of the
whole arrangement-is eminently sensible.

78. The Coalition for Consumer Information on Cosmetics, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.Ieapingbunny.org/faq.htm (last visited May 2 1 , 2004).
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For current or potential employees to assist in enforcement efforts, they
must know about the mark and the rights it guarantees. Some licensees
might use the mark to promote their products with consumers but not alert
employees to its meaning. We doubt that this is a serious concern, however.
As argued below, many employers will use the mark as a tool to recruit po
tential employees who are gay, lesbian, or bisexual. Moreover, gay and
lesbian employees have good incentives to learn about the nondiscrimina
tion policies of their actual or potential employers. The names of all
licensees will be publicly available on the Internet. Gay rights advocacy
groups such as HRC are likely to continue to provide information about the
policies of individual employers. Some employers may not be motivated to
distribute this information to employees on their own. But gay workers are
likely to learn very quickly when their employer has chosen to start marking
its product.
Certification marks usually involve the licensor as an active monitor in
certifying the compliance of the mark user. The mark users pay license fees
to the licensor to cover these monitoring expenses. But we have opted for a
much more decentralized structure that obviates the need for monitoring by
the licensor and the payment of licensing fees. The licensor merely certifies
that the licensee has promised not to discriminate. This certification does
not require licensor effort, because the very act of validly using the mark
constitutes the promise of nondiscrimination. The employees of the licensee
are then left (just as under ENDA) to do the substantive work of enforcing
the underlying promise.
Far more complex enforcement schemes than the Fair Employment
mark have succeeded with regard to other certification marks. For example,
consider the "Orthodox Union" emblem (a letter "U" inside a larger circle
79
or letter "O") certifying that a product is kosher. The Orthodox Union cer
tification service employs a staff of "over

1,000 rabbinic coordinators,
80
kashruth supervisors, food chemists and support personnel." It certifies
"250,000 brand names, hotels, restaurants, services and 2,505 companies in
81
54 countries around the globe." Substantial paperwork and close attention
82
to detail are required of companies using the OU emblem. In contrast, the
Fair Employment mark is a model of procedural licensing simplicity.
An alternative way of supplementing private employee enforcement
would be to specify that particular gay rights advocacy organizations would
have standing as third-party beneficiaries to enforce the agreement. Such

79.
Orthodox Union, OU Kosher Policy Information, http://www.ou.org/kosher/policy.htm
(last visited May 2 1 , 2004).
80. Orthodox Union, About the Orthodox Union, http://www.ou.org/about/ou.htm (last vis
ited May 2 1 , 2004).
81.

Id.

82. The website of the Orthodox Union canies a short article that illustrates the complexity of
compliance. See Orthodox Union, ls Your Kosher Program Running Smoothly?, http://www.ou.org/
kosher/behindsymbol/kosherprog.htm (last visited May 2 1 , 2004).
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83
organizations have standing to enforce other civil rights laws, and extend
ing such enforcement powers might be particularly appropriate when
government enforcement is not forthcoming. Indeed, if an organization such
as the Human Rights Campaign or its Worknet division were to act as the
licensor itself, it would have direct standing as a certifier to ensure that its
licensees were complying with the promises of the license. Even if HRC did
not act as licensor, it might be listed as a third-party beneficiary of the
agreement, again creating the right to enforce the standards of fairness in
employment contained in the agreement.
The power of advocacy groups is also related to the question of auditing.
To facilitate enforcement by agencies and organizations, the licensing

agreement could require the licensee company to permit "testing"-what

some might call "deceptive audits"-by which people who do not really
intend to take jobs or remain in jobs pose as applicants or employees to test
the company's compliance with the licensing agreement. Testing is used
regularly in making sure that minorities are not discriminated against in fed
eral housing programs. States also use testing to judge stores' compliance
with laws against the purchase of alcohol or cigarettes by minors. Similarly,
here testers could apply for a posted job opening and present themselves as
openly bisexual, gay, or lesbian. They could ask about discrimination poli
cies, domestic partner benefits, or LGBT employee groups. They might even
take the jobs temporarily, without a bona fide intention of working for the
company, just to see whether the policies are actually followed once em
ployees enter the company.
Corporate consent to potential auditing is important because it can re
duce the risk that the auditor will be sued by the corporation. In one case, a
company subject to similar testing sued and obtained a large jury verdict
against the testing entity. In Food Lion v. Capital Cities, Food Lion brought
a tort action when ABC broadcast videotape of unwholesome food handling
84
practices. The videotape had been obtained by ABC reporters who gained
85
employment in Food Lion supermarkets by misrepresentation. The plaintiff
alleged fraud, employee disloyalty, and unfair trade practices. The jury re
turned a verdict for the plaintiff, awarding
and over

$1,402 in compensatory damages
$5 million in punitive damages, which the trial j udge reduced to

$315,000 through remittitur.

86

On appeal, the court rej ected Food Lion's

fraud claim, because the reporters were at-will employees for an indefinite
period, and Food Lion could show no reliance on their misrepresentations in
87
With respect to the claims of em

training them and paying their wages.

ployee disloyalty, however, the court held that the reporters intended to act

83.
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372-79 ( 1 982) (giving standing to civilrights organization to sue as fair-housing plaintiff).
84.

Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923, 927 (M.D.N.C. 1997).

85.

Id.

86.

Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 5 1 0 (4th Cir. 1 999).

87.

Id. at 5 1 3-14.
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88

The reporters'

disloyalty also caused the reporters to exceed the consent Food Lion granted
them to enter plaintiff 's premises; the reporters therefore committed tres
89
pass. The court rejected Food Lion's claim that misrepresentations on the
90
job applications alone could vitiate Food Lion's consent.
To avoid anything resembling the Food Lion case, the entity licensing
the Fair Employment mark might include in the licensing agreement a
clause making clear that use of the mark is conditioned upon consent to ran
dom testing. This could create incentives for licensees to comply with the
mark's requirements, and in the event testing did occur, preempt any claims
of fraud or trespass they might bring arising from the testing.
Although there are strong arguments for empowering advocacy groups
like HRC both to audit and to bring suit against licensees, we have chosen,
in the spirit of incrementalism, to maintain a narrow set of potential plain
tiffs and enforcement tools for the initial version of the license. Real
progress can be made just by endowing the direct victims of discrimination
with a power to sue. And to our minds, the costs of scaring away potential
licensees could outweigh these concrete benefits if the licensing scheme
becomes too ambitious or complex. By expressly waiving any right to sue
for violations of the nondiscrimination promise, our license agreement
makes clear that our attitudes toward enforcement are inconsequential. Our
transparent passivity is one less thing for employers to worry about when
deciding whether to commit to the license.
A more modest alternative would be to use a group enforcement system
as a substitute for individual enforcement. Instead of our proposed system of
private causes of action with damages and no auditing, one could instead
have a system of vigorous auditing and no damages. Under this alternative,
loss of the mark would be the only consequence of discriminating. Potential
licensees would not have to worry about potential dollar damages for violat
ing the nondiscrimination promise because the only consequence of such a
finding would be loss of the mark. As a remedial matter, this alternative is
close to the structure of the HRC

100% mark. The HRC takes responsibility

for judging compliance and the consequences of negative assessments are
purely informational-loss of the mark and negative publicity. While this
represents a plausible incremental alternative, we prefer replicating ENDA
rights with legally binding causes of action-at least to the extent that we
can induce a substantial number of employers to sign. The next Section will
argue that it is plausible to expect that a substantial number of employers
may be willing to sign.

88.

Id. at 5 1 5- 1 6.

89.

Id. at 5 1 6-19.

90.

Id. at 5 1 8.
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III. M ARKETING NONDISCRIMINATION
This Section takes on the hard question of why a company might be will
ing to sign up for potential legal liability. One response to the mark is that it is
a nonstarter because no competent general counsel would ever allow a com
pany to volunteer for liability. But this is surely wrong as a matter of a priori
theory. Every contract--every promise, every warranty, every representation
of fact-volunteers for potential legal liability. Business is the art of calcu
lated volunteering and risk-taking, and the crucial empirical question is
whether the benefits of licensing the mark will ever outweigh the costs.
This Section explores the potential benefits of licensing. In large part these
will be the marketing benefits of being seen as a non-discriminator. But the
Section is also about marketing in a second sense. We are also interested in
identifying the set of employers to whom we might be able to market the li
censing agreement. This is not just a theoretical exercise. The publication of
this Article kicks off our campaign to cover

2007.

100,000

employees by the end of

This Section attempts to develop a positive theory that identifies the

conditions under which an employer's benefits are likely to outweigh its costs
of adoption. We will ultimately identify a number of factors that suggest that
the most likely signatories are employers that

are located in one of the seventeen states with statutes that already grant
private rights of action for sexual orientation discrimination;
have independently included sexual orientation in their nondiscrimina
tion policy or have publicly announced support for ENDA;
sell to government entities requiring contractors not to discriminate on
the basis of sexual orientation; or
have smaller market shares.
The first two characteristics describe employers that face smaller addi
tional costs of signing, while the last (smaller market share) describes an
employer for which we predict the net gains in demand will be particularly
high.
A.

The Incremental Costs

As an initial matter, it is important to get a handle on the magnitude of
the potential litigation risk for companies that become licensees. Earlier we
emphasized that the experience of licensees themselves would provide valu
able information on the likely litigation rates that one might see under
ENDA. But it turns out that the United States General Accounting Office
(GAO) has already compiled valuable information on the number of com
plaints filed under state statutes that prohibit employment discrimination on
91
the basis of sexual orientation. In 2000, the GAO analyzed the claim rates
9 1 . U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PuBL' N No. GAO/OGC-00-27R, SEXUALORIENTATION-BASED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: STATES' EXPERIENCE WITH STATUTORY PRO
HIBITIONS SINCE 1 997 (2000).
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The study reported the number

of claims of sexual orientation discrimination made in each state in each
year. But the study failed to analyze the rate of claiming relative to the num
93
ber of employees in each state. When we combine the GAO claim data
with information from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on yearly levels of
state employment, we can more directly assess the incremental litigation
94
risk created by prohibitions on sexual orientation discrimination.

TABLE I :
A NALYSIS OF LITIGATION RATES AND E XPECTED C OSTS
OF S TATE PROHIBITIONS

Employees
Per
Complaint
Averaoe
Maximum
Minimum
Standard
Division

59,739
294,550
18,809
55,309

Gay
Employees
Per
Complaint

1 792
8,837
564
1 ,569

% of Gay
Employees
Filing
Complaints

0.06%
0.18%
0.01%
0.04%

Cost Per
Emplovee

$1 .67
$5.32
$0.34
$1 .23

Cost Per
Gay
Emolovee

$55.80
$1 77.22
$1 1 .32
$41 .09

Notes: Complaint Data taken from GAO Report, supra note 91; Employment Data taken from
Bureau of Labor Statistics Report, infra note 94. In the end, there were sixty-seven state-year
observations. "Gay Employee" calculations assume three percent of employees are gay or
lesbian. "Cost" calculations assume that an employer expects the average complaint to cost

$100,000.
Table

1 shows the results of the analysis. We find that overall the rate of

complaining is relatively low. Averaging over the sixty-seven state-year ob
servations in the data, we find almost

60,000 workers for every sexual

orientation complaint filed. The second column recalculates the complaint

92.

Id. at 7 (these were the states that had claim data available).

93. It instead calculated the proportion of state discrimination complaints that were based on
claims of sexual orientation. Under this analysis, one finds that Vermont experienced a higher pro
portion of sexual orientation complaints than other states. But this might be an artifact of Vermont
having fewer racial and ethnic minority workers than other states. It does not tell us about the ex
pected additional risk that employers face in Vermont because of the employment protections for
gay workers. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW
869 (2d ed. 2004); see also William Rubenstein, Do Gay Rights Laws Matter? An Empirical As
sessment, 75 So. CAL. L. REv. 65 (200 1 ) (arguing that, assuming lesbians and gay men comprise
five percent of the population, rate of sexual orientation discrimination complaints roughly parallels
rate of sex discrimination complaints). William Eskridge and Nan Hunter have noted that the GAO
data "raise as many questions [as] they answer." ESKRIDG E & HUNTER, supra, at 894. For example,
the number of complaints of sexual orientation discrimination does not correspond to total popula
tions (California had actual numbers similar to Massachusetts, which had only one-fifth as many
residents, while Wisconsin, the state whose population is closest to Massachusetts, had fewer than
one-half the number of complaints filed). See id. at 869.
94. See U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment, Hours, and
Earnings from the Current Employment Statistics Survey, http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/
outside.jsp?survey=sm (last visited Feb. 2 1 , 2006), for the number-of-employees figures. The em
ployment number used is the total number of non-agricultural employees for a given state in a given
year. Employment numbers are given on a monthly basis, so we used the average monthly employ
ment for our annual data.
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rate in terms of gay employees-arbitrarily assuming that three percent of
95
all employees are gay or lesbian. The analysis suggests that in an average
year only one out of every

1792

gay employees filed a complaint. In other

words, the probability that a gay employee will file a sexual orientation
charge in any year is six-tenths of one percent.
To give an idea of the economic costs to employers of such complaints,
Table 1 also reports the average costs per employee, assuming that the ex
pected average costs for an employer of responding to a complaint (including
costs of diverted attention, attorney fees, legal damages, and so forth) is

$100,000.

This is a ballpark estimate (possibly generous) that is only an at

tempt to measure the probable magnitude of the costs of this new type of
liability. Table

1

suggests that the overall costs to date have been low. The

$2 per year ($ 1.67).
1 calculates the expected annual costs per gay
a more substantial average cost: about $56 per year.

average cost of these laws per employee is less than
The final column of Table
employee. Here we see

On net, for each additional year a statute has been in effect, the expected
96
9.7 cents.

annual cost per employee rises by

This analysis suggests that the state statutes have not substantially in
creased the overall wage bill. Measured on a per-employee or a per-gay
employee basis, it is hard to think that the costs of responding to litigation
complaints are driving employer resistance to making binding nondiscrimi97
nation prormses.
•

•

Concerns about added litigation expense provide an even weaker excuse
for employers in places that prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in
employment by state statute. There are currently seventeen states (including
98
the District of Columbia) that legislatively prohibit such discrimination.

95.

Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to
68 So. CAL. L. REv. 745, 776-79 ( 1995) (conservatively adopting
three percent, based upon surveys and other social scientific research). The point of this exercise is
to give an estimate for the magnitude of the rate. Since the second column is merely the first column
multiplied by the proportion of workers who are gay, readers can easily calculate claim rates based
on alternative assumptions.
See

Recognize Same-Sex Marriage,

96. An Ordinary Least Squares regression of the annual costs per employee on a variety of
factors suggests that the general cost is decreasing over time, but for each state, costs increase the
longer the law is in effect. The regression controlled for "year of the observation;' "years law has
been in effect in this state" and ten state dummy variables. The background data and analysis is
publicly downloadable at http://islandia.law.yale.edu/ayres/Analysis%20of%20GA0%20Data%
20Concem%20Sexual%200rtn%20Disc%20Statutes.xls.
97. We will consider whether the threat of consumer boycotts provides an alternative cost
basis. Infra Section ill.C.
98. According to the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, 47% of the U.S. population lives
in jurisdictions that have adopted nondiscrimination laws. This includes 38% who live in states with
such laws; another 9% are covered by city or county law. See SEAN CAHILL, THE GLASS NEARLY
HALF FULL: 47% OF U.S. POPULATION LIVES IN JURISDICTION WITH SEXUAL ORIENTATION NON
DISCRIMINATION LAW 3-4 (2005), http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/GlassHalfFull.pdf. The
states are California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Ver
mont, Washington, and Wisconsin. See Human Rights Campaign Foundation, Non-Discrimination
Laws: State-by-State, http://www.hrc.org (follow "Laws in Your State" hyperlink; then follow
"Statewide Anti-discrimination Laws and Policies" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
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Adopting the mark exposes employers in these states to no additional liabil
ity, because they are independently amenable to suit under the state
analogue to the license. Indeed, the laws in many of these states are more
expansive than the Fair Employment mark duties because they include the
possibility of punitive damages, expose employers to potential disparate
impact claims, or have been interpreted to cover gender identity and expres
sion. 99 The marginal benefits of protecting workers in these states with the
Fair Employment mark are greatly reduced, but so too are the marginal costs
of providing this contractual coverage.
A similar argument applies to employers that have independently in
cluded sexual orientation within their nondiscrimination policy. Employers
that have already committed themselves not to discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation have little to lose in the way of legal liability by signing
the Fair Employmentlicense. But the issue is complicated by the uncertain
legal effect of nondiscrimination policies. It might come as a surprise to
some readers, but in some jurisdictions the majestic language of "policies"
does not give rise to legally binding "promises." Employers that include
sexual orientation in their nondiscrimination policies have been known to
tum around and claim that they have no legal duty not to discriminate-and
they sometimes win.
Cases considering the contractual enforceability of nondiscrimination
provisions in employee handbooks and company policies follow a somewhat
similar structure. They start with the at-will presumption, namely that an
employment relationship is presumed to be terminable at will on both sides.
Sometimes, courts go on to rule that handbooks or policies

can

create en

forceable obligations (typically by establishing specific procedures or
criteria for termination). In a smaller number of cases, the courts consider
whether the specific nondiscrimination provision at issue is enforceable.
Some courts have held that even very clear language

in an employee

handbook (e.g., "No employee shall be dismissed without just cause") was
unenforceable under contract because it did not meet the traditional re
100
quirements of contract formation.
For example, in Joachim v. AT&T
99.
See, e.g., Assemb. B. 2900, 2004 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004) (amending existing labor
and employment nondiscrimination provisions in California law to be consistent with the nondiscrimi
nation provisions of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), including prohibitions on
discrimination on the basis of gender identity); Assemb. B. 1 96, 2003 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003)
(amending Fair Employment and Housing law to include gender identity and gender status); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 10:5-1 (West 2002); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-300 (McKinney 2005); see also Equality
California, AB 2900: The Omnibus Labor and Employment Non-Discrimination Act,
http://www.eqca.org/atf/cf/ { 687DF34F-6480-4BCD-9C2B- l F33FD8El 294 }/AB_2900_factsheet.pdf
(last visited Apr. 25, 2005); New Jersey Office of the Attorney General, Division of Civil Rights: Em
ployment, http://www.state.nj .us/lps/dcr/employ.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2005) (explaining that the
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination includes disparate impact claims). See generally National Gay
& Lesbian Task Force, Scope of Explicitly Transgender-lnclusive Anti-Discrimination Laws,
http://www.transgenderlaw.org/ndlaws/ngltftlpichart.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2005) (listing states and
towns with employment protections for transgendered people).
100. Joachim v. AT&T Info. Sys., 793 F.2d 1 13 (5th Cir. 1 986) (per curiam) (quoting Rey
nolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. App. 1 982)) (holding that although AT&T's
personnel handbook said that sexual orientation would not be used as a basis for job discrimination
or termination and plaintiff alleged that he was terminated because he was gay, "employee hand-

1 673

Mark(etlinrt. Nondiscrimination

Jun" 'W06]

Info rmation Systems, the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment against a
plaintiff who invoked the employer's handbook when complaining of sexual
orientation discrimination, because the court concluded that the handbook
did not form a contract

101

The issue is complicated because the legal enforceability of nondis
crimination policies (and employee handbooks more generally) is in flux.
Some courts have held that nondiscrimination provisions can give rise to
enforceable obligations.

102

For example, Albertus Magnus College was un

able to persuade a federal district court in 2000 that its nondiscrimination
policy was not an enforceable contract under state law.

103

Arizona has an open-ended test that relies heavily on particular facts to
determine whether handbook language is enforceable. This test is motivated
by the policy that if "an employer does choose to issue a policy statement, in
a manual or otherwise, and, by its language or by the employer's actions,
encourages reliance thereon, the employer cannot be free to only selectively

books 'constituted no more than general guidelines,' and did not create a contractual right in the
employees"); Johnson v. Nat'! Beef Packing Co., 551 P.2d 779, 781-82 (Kan. 1 976) (holding that
although company policy manual said, "No employee shall be dismissed without just cause," "[i]t
was only a unilateral expression of company policy and procedures. Its terms were not bargained for
by the parties and any benefits conferred by it were mere gratuities. Certainly, no meeting of the
minds was evidenced by the defendant's unilateral act of publishing company policy."); Poree v.
Lakewind E. Apartments, Civ. A. No. 93-3466, 1 994 WL 705428, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 1 5 , 1 994)
(deciding that although employee handbook described a company policy of nondiscrimination and
plaintiff alleged racial discrimination in violation of that policy, complaint was dismissed because
"under Louisiana law. employee handbooks and personnel policy manuals do not in themselves
create contractual rights between the employer and employee"); Hillie v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.,
5 1 2 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Neb. 1 994) (suggesting that any language in a handbook that reserves discre
tion in the employer to (a) follow handbook procedures, or (b) fire the employee at will has effect of
negating the existence of a contractual promise not to discriminate); Morosetti v. La. Land and
Exploration Co., 564 A.2d 1 5 1 , 153 (Pa. 1 989) (holding that when company circulated a severance
pay policy, but later denied severance pay to several employees, there was no contract because a
"company may indeed have a policy upon which they intend to act, given certain circumstances or
events, but unless they communicate that policy as part of a definite offer of employment they are
free to change as events may require").
101.

See Joachim,

793 F.2d at 1 14.

1 02.
See, e.g., Black v. Baker Oil Tools, Inc., 107 F.3d 1457, 1 462 ( 1 0th Cir. 1997) (holding
that "the promise that ' [a]ll relations and decisions pertaining to employment . . . [and] terminations
. . . will be executed without regard to . . . physical . . . handicap . . . .' is more than a mere 'vague
assurance' or 'puffery,' but rather is a 'substantive restriction' on Baker Oil's ability to terminate its
employees;" still, plaintiff must give consideration for this obligation); Adleta v. Gen. Elec., No. C1 -94-559, 1 996 WL 365783, at *4-5 (S.D. Ohio May 28, 1 996) ("Ohio appears to recognize a cause
of action based upon a company's employment policies and procedures . . . . In order to create a
binding obligation, these representations must satisfy the traditional elements of contract Jaw
namely, offer, acceptance and consideration."); Johnson v. Celsius Energy Co., No. C88-0227-1 3,
1989 WL 260154, at *4 (D. Wyo. Feb. 28, 1 989) (holding that when defendant's employee hand
book "prohibits unlawful discrimination in all aspects and conditions of employment, including
hiring, training, advancement, compensation, transfers, benefits, and terminations," such language
negates employment at-will because it "creates an expectation on the part of an employee that [the
provision] will be followed, inducing an employee to continue his employment," thereby negating
"employment at-will") (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
1 03. Hartwig v. Albertus Magnus Coll., 93 F. Supp. 2d 200 (D. Conn. 2000); see also Durham
Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, No. CIV.A.94-0801 , 1 994 WL 447406, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 1 994)
(allowing employee's claim for breach of contract in sexual harassment suit to proceed), aff'd, 39
F.3d 1 1 69 (3d Cir. 1 994).
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abide by it. Having announced a policy, the employer may not treat it as
104
illusory."
California also has an open�ended, multifactor test examining
"the totality of the circumstances . . . . Every case thus turns on its own
105
facts."
Massachusetts recently liberalized its test for determining whether
company policies can give rise to contractual obligations, finding contrac
tual language in a personnel manual because it "g[a]ve each employee the
right to expect that she will be treated fairly" even though there was no ex
106
press language guaranteeing discharge only for cause.
Like the court in Arizona, the Massachusetts Supreme Court was driven
by a desire for fundamental fairness:

Management distributes personnel manuals because it is thought to be in
its best interests to do so. Such a practice encourages employee security,
satisfaction, and loyalty and a sense that every employee will be treated
fairly and equally. Management expects that employees will adhere to the
obligations that the manual sets forth. Courts recently have been reluctant
to permit management to reap the benefits of a personnel manual and at the
same time avoid promises freely made in the manual that employees rea
sonably believed were part of their arrangement with the employer.
Management voluntarily offers, and defines the terms of, any benefit set
forth in its unbargained for personnel manual. The employees may have a
reasonable expectancy that management will adhere to a manual's provi07
SJOnS. 1
•

Although one federal court recently applied New Jersey law to rule non
discrimination provisions unenforceable, the New Jersey Supreme Court has
found handbook language enforceable when such language is definite and
promissory (for example, "efforts will be made to take one or more of the
108
following measures"). This language even overrode an express disclaimer

found elsewhere in the handbook. I()')
The trend is moving away from requiring that the employee knew or re
110
lied on the policy.
But courts still at times refuse to enforce

I 04. Leikvold v. Valley View Cmty. Hosp., 688 P.2d 1 70, 1 74 (Ariz. 1 984). It should be noted
that the employee's reliance is not necessary: it is "only one of several factors that are relevant in
determining whether a particular policy was intended by the parties to modify an at-will agreement."
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 7 1 0 P.2d 1025, 1038 (Ariz. 1985).
1 05. Guz v. Bechtel Nat'! , Inc., 8 P.3d 1 089, 1 1 0 1 (Cal. 2000) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
106.

O'Brien v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 N.E.2d 843, 849 (Mass. 1 996).

107.

Id.

108.

Geldreich v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 691 A.2d 423, 427 (N.J. 1997).

109.

Id.

at 848-49 (citation omitted).

1 1 0. See, e.g., Marfia v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, 903 F. Supp. 463, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding
the employer bank's "Non-Discrimination Policy" set forth in employee manual "surely can be read
as a contractual limitation on the Bank's ability to discharge employees for discriminatory rea
sons"). But see Gruver v. Ezon Prods., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 772, 774 (M.D. Pa. 1 99 1 ) (deciding that to
establish contractual violation, employee must establish that harassment policy in personnel manual
induced her employment).
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nondiscrimination policies because they find that the policies were too
111

vague or were not intended to be legally enforceable.
Nondiscrimination policies may also fail to cover discrimination against
rejected applicants. Since the rejected applicant is not hired, courts find no
enforceable promise between the applicant and the employer. Applicants
may argue that even if there is not an employment contract, there was an
independent application contract whereby the applicant agreed to apply in
return for the employer's promise to consider the application on a nondis
criminatory basis. But courts might resurrect the requirement that the
applicant knew and actually relied on the employer policy. In contrast, the
Fair Employment mark license expressly grants rejected applicants rights to
sue for discrimination. Rej ected applicants thus represent another diver
gence in potential legal risk even for employers that have included sexual
orientation in their nondiscrimination policy.
At the moment, the most that one can say is that employer nondiscrimi
nation policies are only probabilistically enforceable. The magnitude of the
probability depends upon the jurisdiction, whether the plaintiff is an appli
cant or an employee, and details of how the policy was promulgated and
presented. The Fair Employment mark represents a real gain for civil rights
because it grants employees certain, as opposed to uncertain, rights to sue.
The flip side of that coin, however, is that adopting the mark exposes some
employers to higher potential liability. But since any employer that has vol
untarily included sexual orientation in its nondiscrimination clause already
faces some prospect of litigation, employers with inclusive nondiscrimina
tion policies have relatively less to fear in terms of litigation from signing
the license.
Employer willingness-to-sign will of course tum on the benefits as well
as these costs of signing. An analysis of litigation experience under state
nondiscrimination statutes suggests that the litigation risk incurred by sign
ing is in fact rather low. Moreover, employers that are bound by these state
statutes or by their own voluntary policies of nondiscrimination have even
less reason to resist committing to nondiscrimination. Employers may worry
instead that adopting the mark will expose them to consumer boycotts that
will reduce the demand for their products. We expressly address this con
cern below. But the idea of added litigation risk is not a conversation
stopper, if employers rationally assess its true magnitude.
B.

Risk Management

Indeed, some employers might adopt the mark specifically to contain
their potential liability for discrimination. This seems paradoxical, certainly:
how could volunteering for liability ever reduce risk? The answer lies in the
probabilistic enforcement currently given to nondiscrimination policies, as
outlined above. As Ian Ayres and Richard Ober argue, "Increasingly courts

1 1 1 . E.g., Blaise-Williams v. Sumitomo Bank Ltd., 592 N.Y.S.2d 4 1 , 42 (App. Div. 1 993) (ruling
that general antidiscrimination statement in handbook was too vague to be enforceable).
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are interpreting these nondiscrimination policies to be nondiscrimination
promises. And when they do, they can impose open-ended forms of liabil
1 12
A move from "policies" to explicit "promises" is prudent because it
ity."
can give employers more control over their potential exposure. As Ayres and
Ober explain, a policy that prohibits "discrimination" might be interpreted
to give employees both "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact" causes
113
of action.
The Fair Employment mark license contains potential liability
by expressly limiting plaintiffs' theories of discrimination to disparate
treatment.
Similarly, the Fair Employment mark license gives employers proce
dural safeguards. Employees are required to give notice of claims within

180 days of the occurrence. Also important, the Fair Employment mark li
cense can be used in conjunction with an arbitration clause in employee
contracts. Instead of leaving potential liability up to the judicial coin toss of
nondiscrimination policies, some employers might prefer to commit to non
discrimination in a way that is enforceable and clearly defined.
C.

Satisfying Input Demand

The next Section will assess the impact of the mark on consumer de
mand. But before doing that, it is useful to assess the impact of the license
on the flow of various inputs to a finn . Most basically, adopting the Fair
Employment mark may be an attractive mechanism for recruiting gay and
lesbian employees. Members of the gay community have strong incentives
to learn about the nondiscrimination policies of prospective employers and,
other things being equal, are likely to prefer employers that promise not to
discriminate. Some employers may even prefer the mark to the passage of
ENDA because it gives them a means of meaningfully distinguishing them
selves from other employers.
The Fair Employment mark is particularly helpful here because it is
something that the employer commits to before it negotiates contracts with
individual employees. Employees who value nondiscrimination may be re
luctant to propose such a tenn because it might also signal to the employer
1 14
that the potential employees are litigious.
But by adopting the mark, the
employer can satisfy employee demand (at low cost) without requiring this
kind of signaling.

1 1 2.
Ian Ayres & Richard F. Ober, Jr., Corporate Non-Discrimination Policies: The Hollow
Promise 3-4 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
1 1 3.

Id. at 4.

1 1 4. It is a well-known result of contracting theory that defaults will become sticky
when suggestions to alter the contract reflect badly on the proposer. Omri Ben-Shahar & John
Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006), avail
able at http://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/olin/abstracts/discussionpapers/2005/
05-0I Obenshahar.pdf; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the
Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, I O I YALE L.J. 729 ( 1 992); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic
Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 1 00 YALE L.J. 6 1 5 ( 1 990).
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Of course, one needs to consider whether adopting the mark would
make other employees less likely to work for the employer. At least as a
theoretical matter, adoption could induce employee boycotts. While worthy
of consideration, we doubt that this is a serious concern. At least with regard
to employers that have voluntarily included sexual orientation in their non
discrimination policies, it is unlikely that there would be any additional
adverse impact of adopting a formal commitment not to discriminate. And
more generally, the public opinion is strongly in favor of equal employment
opportunity. It is hard to imagine many applicants saying, "I

refuse to work

for Company X because it promises not to discriminate."
An employer's adoption of the mark might also be driven by employee
preferences in another way. Unions might collectively bargain for adoption
of the mark. Pride at Work, the AFL-CIO affiliate group that promotes
LGBT employment equality, has already been successful in having formal
115
nondiscrimination promises included in union contracts.
But unions usu
ally bargain

for enforcement procedures

that

utilize union grievance

procedures-and unions may be reluctant to bargain for adoption of the
mark because it allows individual union members independent private rights
116
of action.
Adopting the mark might also facilitate the flow of other inputs, includ
ing the certification of oversight organizations. Certifying organizations may
urge or require adoption of a binding commitment not to discriminate. The
Association of American Law Schools (AALS), for example, not only re
quires

member

schools

to

include

sexual

orientation

in

their

own

nondiscrimination policies, but also to stop discrimination by employers
117
utilizing the schools' career placement facilities.
B ut neither of these pro
visions requires a legally binding promise not to discriminate. For example,
AALS provides as follows:

A member school shall inform employers of its obligation under Executive
Committee Regulation 6-3(b) [the AALS's nondiscrimination policy], and
shall require employers, as a condition of obtaining any form of placement
assistance or use of the school's facilities, to provide an assurance of the
employer's willingness to observe the principles of equal opportunity
stated in Bylaw 6-3(b). 118

1 1 5 . For a guide t o negotiating such contracts, see Pride A t Work, Seven Easy Steps For Add
ing Domestic Partner Benefits To Your Union Contract (Apr. 2005), http://prideatwork.org/
public/documents/press/2005/Seven%20Easy%20Steps%20For%20Adding%20Domestic%20Partner
%20Benefits%20To%20Your%20Union%20Contract.pdf.
1 1 6. Indeed, it is arguable that an employer's signing of the licensing agreement in any union
ized setting might constitute a violation of its collective bargain duty. But no union to our
knowledge has ever complained about inclusion of sexual orientation in nondiscrimination policies
which, at least probabilistically, also create independent rights of action.
1 1 7.

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, 2005 HANDBOOK 60 (2005).

1 1 8.

Id. AALS Bylaw 6-3(b) provides as follows:

A member school shall pursue a policy of providing its students and graduates with equal op
portunity to obtain employment, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race,
color, religion, national origin, sex, age, disability, or sexual orientation. A member school
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Providing "an assurance" of a "willingness to observe the principles of
equal opportunity" may well fall short of a promise not to discriminate. In
deed, many law schools fail to require a clear promise. For example, for
years Yale Law School has merely required employers participating in the
school's interview programs to sign the following "Non-Discrimination
Statement":

I, [Name of Representative] an authorized representative of [Name of Em
ployer] affirm that said employer is aware of and complies with Yale Law
School's nondiscrimination policy, as stated below:

Yale Law School reaffirms its policy against discriminatory employment
practices. The law school does not countenance any form of discrimination
based upon age, color, handicap or disability, ethnic or national origin,
race, religion, religious creed, gender (including discrimination taking the
form of sexual harassment), marital, parental or veteran status, sexual ori
119
entation, or the prejudice of clients.
The legal effect of this document is not free from doubt. The representa
tive is signing a "statement," not a "contract." She is "affirming," not
"promising." The key question is whether "affirm[ing] that said employer
. . . complies with" the law school policy of "not countenanc[ing] any form
of discrimination based upon . . . sexual orientation" is a legally binding
contractual commitment. And if it is, it is uncertain whether students have
third-party beneficiary status to enforce violations of the promise.
But just as the Corporate Equality Index could be easily changed to re
quire binding legal commitments, the AALS provisions and the law school
"Non-Discrimination Statement" could be easily changed to require prom
ises. AALS Bylaw 6.4(b) could be amended in this manner:

A member school shall eemmttHiettte te require each employer to whom it
furnishes assistance and facilities for interviewing and other placement
functions the seheel's fiFm eiqieettttien that the emvleyeF will to promise to
observe the principle of equal opportunity.
Alternatively, the AALS might simply require that member schools (1)
sign the Fair Employment license, and (2) require employers receiving
1 20
placement assistance to sign the license.
Such a requirement-by a power-

shall communicate to each employer to whom it furnishes assistance and facilities for inter
viewing and other placement functions the school's firm expectation that the employer will
observe the principle of equal opportunity.
Id.
1 1 9. Yale Law School Career Development Office, Registration Form for Fall Interview Pro
gram 2005, http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/pdf/Career_Development/cdo-empreg05 .pdf (last
visited Jan. 26 2006).
1 20. A third and analogous regulation would be a requirement that member schools promise
not to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in their own admissions. AALS Bylaw 6-3(a)
currently requires that member schools "shall provide equality of opportunity . . . without discrimi
nation . . . on the ground of . . . sexual orientation." But member schools need to provide applicants
with a viable private cause of action-and few schools clearly do. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW
SC HOOLS, supra note 1 1 7, at 33-34.

June 2006]

Mark(et)ing Nondiscrimination

1679

ful input supplier-would in one fell swoop provide clear and enforceable
private causes of action to the direct victims of employment discrimination.
The restrictions on employer recruiting are animated by law schools' de
sire not to have their facilities used in the service of discrimination. A
similar motivation might apply to faculty recommendations. Many faculty
would not want to participate in the evaluation process for an employer that
retains the legal right to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. The
Fair Employment mark gives faculty a means to make sure they steer clear
of such employers. In the not-too-distant future, one could imagine that fac
ulty might decline to write recommendations to employers that refused to
sign the license.
Beyond these requirements, input suppliers can powerfully influence the
contracting equilibrium just by the way they frame questions. Consider for
example NALP, the National Association for Law Placement. Its law firm
questionnaire currently makes the open-ended request: "State your organiza
121
tion's nondiscrimination policy."
But imagine what would happen if
instead it asked, "Has your organization promised not to discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation?" We predict that the vast majority of firms
would check "Yes" and in so doing would probably give applicants an en
122
Or alternatively,

forceable legal right to sue for violations of the promise.

NALP could more directly exploit the subject of this Article by asking, "Has
your organization licensed the Fair Employment mark?"
At the end of the day, adoption of the license is not just a recruitment
tool, but for many employers it might be a way of staying in good graces
with a variety of input suppliers-including certifying and membership or
ganizations and outside evaluators. Both the push of institutional pressure
(as already seen in the case of union and AALS requirements) and the pull
of recruiting advantages (as seen in N ALP disclosures of nondiscrimination
policies) may tip employers toward adoption.
D. Additional

Consumer Demand

While upstream input suppliers may motivate some employers, the
prospect of additional downstream demand as a motive for adoption is more
directly tied to the idea of a certification mark. The Fair Employment mark
certifies nondiscrimination to potential employees, but like other certifica
tion marks, the Fair Employment mark can also be used as a marketing tool
to certify product quality to potential purchasers. In this Section, we will
explore the plausible impact of the mark on consumer demand-first, in a
world of "acoustic separation" (where sellers are able to convey a targeted
message to gay rights supporters without signaling opponents) and second,
1 2 1 . National Association of Legal Professionals, Law Firm Questionnaire 2005-2006 Aca
demic Year, http://www.law2.byu.edu/Career_Services/firrnforrn.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2006).
1 22. An applicant who had been discriminated against could not only argue that he or she was
an intended third-party beneficiary of the promise, but could also argue that, by checking the box on
the NALP recruitment form, the organization was offering not to discriminate in return for the ap
plicant's application.
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in a world of full information where the prospect of consumer boycotts must
be weighed against the benefits of consumer "buycotts."

1. Government Contractor Ordinances
Before delving into these questions of impact on generalized consumer
demand, it is important to appreciate the possible impact of what we might
call "regulated demand." Just as the last Section illustrated the potential im
pact of input pressure that has been brought to bear by particular unions and
certifying organizations, demand-side pressure can be brought to bear by
particularly powerful individual purchasers-state and local governments.
Dozens of cities and counties prohibit public contractors from discrimi
123
These government entities in

nating on the basis of sexual orientation.

effect will only purchase goods and services from suppliers that promise not
to discriminate. These contractor ordinances are at times redundant with
state statutory prohibitions on employment discrimination. Thus, for exam
ple, San Jose's ordinance prohibiting discrimination by city contractors does
not substantively affect any California suppliers, who are independently
124
prohibited from sexual orientation discrimination by state statute.
But
these contractor laws have potential bite in two different circumstances.
First, they have sometimes been adopted by cities and counties located in
jurisdictions that have not prohibited private employment discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. For example, Phoenix and Cleveland require
nondiscrimination by city contractors, but their respective states do not pro
125
hibit discrimination by employers generally.
Second, even in places (such
as San Jose) where employment discrimination by private employers is gen
erally prohibited, the local ordinances can still have an impact as local
governments sometimes contract with out-of-state suppliers that would oth
erwise be allowed to discriminate.
But to date, local compliance officers have lacked an effective mecha
nism for assuring compliance. Much like the AALS and its member schools,
the compliance officers have been satisfied with contractor assurances that
they do not discriminate or the contractors' inclusion of sexual orientation in
their nondiscrimination policies. But as explained above, these nondiscrimi
nation policies are at times nonbinding commitments, often failing to equip
the victims of discrimination with effective enforcement mechanisms. The
advent of the Fair Employment mark changes all this. Compliance officers
can simply ask whether a contractor has signed the license. As we move
forward to roll out the mark, we plan to urge local contractor compliance

1 23. See generally WAYNE VAN DER MEIDE, THE POLICY INST. OF THE NAT'L GAY AND LES
BIAN TASK FORCE, LEGISLATING EQUALITY: A REVIEW OF LAWS AFFECTING GAY, LESBIAN,
BISEXUAL, AND ThANSGENDERED PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES (2000) , http://
www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/legeq99.pdf.
1 24.

Id.

1 25. See generally PHOENIX, ARIZ., CODE § 1 8 - 1 5 (2005); CLEVELAND, OHIO, ADMIN. CODE
§ 187.04 ( 1 994); CLEVELAND, Omo, OFFENSES & Bus. ACTIVITIES CODE § 667.05 ( 1 997); see also
TOWN OF LAKE PARK, FLA., CODE § 2-1 10 ( 1 996).
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officers to consider promoting o r requiring the use of the mark as a means of
fulfilling the cities' requirements. At the very least, the mark should provide
a credible commitment device for contractors that are trying to demonstrate
their compliance with a city's nondiscrimination mandate.

2. The Impact on Demand in a World of "Acoustic Separation "
An employer may worry that adopting the mark will promote a backlash
of reduced demand. The very hostility toward gay, lesbian, and bisexual
people that makes the protections of the mark valuable could also work
against the mark. Opponents of gay rights can read product labels as well as
allies, and some companies may refuse to use the mark out of fear of boy
cotts. But before considering the impact of boycotts, we first explore how
the mark might work in a world with a kind of "acoustic separation"-that
is, a world in which the proponents of gay rights learn of a firm's adoption,
126

but the opponents of equality do not.

The benchmark of "acoustic separation" is not as outlandish as it might
first appear. The kosher symbol provides one possible illustration. The

"U"

encircled by an "O" is so innocuous that many anti-Semites miss the signal,
even though they might wish to punish companies that affirmatively market
121
The Fair Employment mark proposed here

products to Jewish consumers.

would be similarly opaque. For consumers "in the know," the mark could
create incentives to buy particular products. But there is nothing about the
appearance of the mark as proposed to tie it to gay rights or gay people gen
erally. More explicitly "gay" symbols-a pink triangle, a rainbow flag, or
the Greek letter lambda-would certainly be more transparent: even con
sumers who had never heard of the mark would know that the company
using the symbol is positioning itself in sympathy with the gay community.
But this more explicit positioning would also run the risk of alienating con
sumers who are hostile to gay rights (who will react to an explicitly "gay"
symbol but not to a neutral one).
Moreover, an employer's adoption of the license gives the employer the
option, but not the duty, to display the mark. The mark need not be dis
played on every product or indeed on any product. Licensees may choose to
display the mark selectively, in contexts where it is more likely that allies
will see the mark. They might decide to display the mark only in certain
advertisements or in certain states.
By reaching out to ally consumers, the Fair Employment mark promotes
a kind of "buycott." It allows equal rights proponents to "vote with their
wallets." The time may be particularly ripe to troll for pent up equality de-

1 26. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1 984).
1 27 . Occasionally, anti-Semitic groups do call for boycotts of products labeled as kosher, but
these movements seem to attract few followers. See, e.g., Anti-Defamation League, Bigotry Over a
Beer Label, http://www.adl.org/special_reports/kosher_tax/kosher_coors.asp (last visited Jan. 23,
2006) (noting that some extremist groups call for a boycott of foods and companies that succumb
to the "kosher conspiracy").
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mand. Progressives who are trapped in "red" states do not have a govern
mental outlet for their political perspective to be heard. Patronizing firms
that have privately adopted ENDA-have promised not to discriminate-is
a pragmatic way of making progress on employment equality, particularly
when local and federal legislatures are not ready to act.
Even opponents of marriage for same-sex couples could be counted as
potential consumers of products bearing the mark. A frequent claim of mar
riage opponents is that they believe in treating gay people fairly, but they
just think that marriage by definition is between a man and a woman. By
embracing the Fair Employment mark either as licensees or consumers,
marriage opponents can prove their bona fides as believers in employment
equality.
In recent years, gay rights advocates have sometimes flexed the commu
nity's economic muscles. The "gay dollar" is now a recognized-if
controversial-phenomenon. By stamping or writing the words "gay dollar"
on ordinary dollar bills, the gay community can tangibly signal the number
of dollars that literally pass through gay hands. These marked dollars are
meant to demonstrate the spending power of the gay community. The gay
community and its supporters have sought to exercise that spending power
positively. For example, when voters in Tampa, Florida, enacted an antigay
rights ordinance, the Human Rights Task Force of Florida responded by in
stituting a buycott rather than a boycott. The group published a directory of
128
businesses that have "policies in support of gays and lesbians." In the first
five months of the directory's publication, the list grew from 105 to 430 en
129
tries.
Todd Simmons, spokesperson for the Human Rights Task Force of
Florida, explained, "We decided on an approach that would empower us
economically and politically. The buycott has improved our standing in the
community. Businesses and other institutions have changed their policies to
130
get in our book."
Large companies have launched advertising campaigns targeted to gay
consumers, including AT&T, Anheuser-Busch, Apple Computer, Benetton,
131
Philip Morris, Seagram, Sony, and Absolut.
George Slowik, publisher of

Out magazine, notes that gay men and lesbians are "an audience not accus
tomed to being courted, so they're more apt to notice who's supportive and
who's not, particularly at this point. The first ones in will reap extra benefits

1 28.

Michael Wright, Avoidance Tactics, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1993, at 44, 48.

1 29.

Id.

1 30.

Id.

1 3 1 . Stuart Elliott, A Sharper View of Gay Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, June 9 , 1 994, at D I . The
story of Absolut vodka illustrates the way gay and lesbian consumers demonstrate loyalty to suppor
tive manufacturers and other businesses. Absolut, it seems, was one of the first major labels to
advertise in gay publications. According to Rick Dean, Vice President of Overlooked Opinions,
"The gay community tied it back-Absolut was there on the back cover of gay publications before
the others, and Absolut vodka is poured at gay bars." Mary Gottschalk, Gay Cachet: Advenisers Get
Wise to the Fact that the Gay and Lesbian Community Is a $500 Billion a Year Gold Mine, SAN JosE
MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 19, 1993, at IH.
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The same sort of loyalty that allows a firm to "reap ex

tra benefits" as the "first one in" could allow the first firms that adopt the
mark to reap extra revenue from consumers wishing to show their support
133
for nondiscrimination.
M.V. Lee Badgett has examined the three distinct roles that gay, lesbian,
and bisexual people can play in an economic system: "consumers," "inves
134
tors," and "producers."
Many companies have recognized the LGBT
community as an important group of consumers and have developed adver
tising to target this market. The concerns of gay people and their allies as
investors are reflected in rating systems that grade companies for their gay
135
friendliness.
As producers, LGBT people get some recognition in nondis
crimination policies, statutes, and local ordinances; employee benefit
programs; and other incentives offered by companies that wish to recruit
talented people, regardless of sexual orientation. Tools like the HRC Corpo
rate Equality Index can help potential employees to identify the companies
that respect LGBT people as producers. The Fair Employment mark com
plements

these

existing

strategies

as

it

conveys

information

about

companies' employment practices to a wider audience in a decentralized
way. In a sense, the mark completes the circle by allowing gay and nongay
consumers to tie their purchasing decisions to the fair treatment of gay and
lesbian employees.
A key characteristic of the mark is that it could facilitate heterosexual
support for gay rights in ways that need not be public. This could create op
portunities to work for gay rights for a new group of "stealth" supporters
people who, for any number of reasons, are not able or willing to act pub
licly, but who wish at the very least to spend their money responsibly. As
heterosexual consumers begin to feel aligned with the cause through their
purchasing decisions, other more public forms of support might start to feel
comfortable as well. Perhaps most importantly, from simple, every day con
sumer choices, an internal sense of connection to and identification with
LGBT people could grow. This internal change might lead nongay people to
act-especially to speak up for equality in various contexts. Thus, a small

1 32.

Id.

1 33 . This brand loyalty i s also evident i n the travel industry. According t o one marketing
executive, "All a mainstream company has to do is show up at a gay travel expo and because of
brand loyalty, gay and gay-friendly travelers will use them and their business will increase." Stu
Glauberman, Gay Tourism: Island Companies Tap a Growing Market, HONOLULU ADVERTISER,
Feb. 14, 1 994, at C l .
134. M.V. Lee Badgett, Thinking Homo/Economically, i n OVERCOMING HETEROSEXISM AND
HOMOPHOBIA: STRATEGIES THAT WORIC 380 (James T. Sears & Walter L. Williams eds., 1997).
1 35 . The Equality Project, for example, "is a consumer, employee and investor advocacy
coalition working to support and monitor workplace awareness and adoption of the progressive
policies expressed in the Equality Principles as endorsed by leading LGBT organizations." The
Equality Project, http://www.equalityproject.org/content/accomp.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2006).
The HRC Corporate Equality Index also helps investors avoid discriminatory companies and direct
their money to companies that treat LGBT employees fairly. Human Rights Campaign Foundation,
supra note 68.
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symbol on a product label could help to mobilize a broader base of hetero
sexual support for LGBT equality.

3. The Impact on Demand: Boycotts
Notwithstanding the innocuous nature of the mark itself and notwith
standing the selective and targeted disclosure of the mark by licensees, it is
still possible that adopting the mark will cause a licensee to lose some po
tential consumers of its goods or services. Adopting the mark may cause a
conservative group to call for boycotts of the gay-friendly company. Even
more troublesome, licensees must consider whether adoption will cause in
dividual consumers independently to shift their consumption to other
suppliers. Consumers may be turned off by the politicization of the product.
The privacy of the grocery aisle, which liberates allies to purchase the prod
uct without being challenged, also may liberate opponents to buy a close
substitute without being challenged. Indeed, the decision to switch might
not even be based on conscious disapproval of the firm's adoption of the
136
mark; it might be an unconscious or implicit attitude.
While boycotts are
137
seldom effective,
the fear of individual, unconscious turnoffs should not
be ignored by any profit-maximizing producer.
The concern that the mark may disaffect some consumers may be par
ticularly important for firms with large market shares. In concentrated
industries where a few companies have captured the market, each company
has a lot to lose if it alienates a significant portion of the market. In such
markets, a boycott could cause real economic loss if antigay consumers far
outnumber pro-gay consumers. In such circumstances, it will always be in at
least one company's self-interest to reject the mark-being known as the
one company that is not "gay friendly" could help that company capture
antigay consumers' business (just as the Fair Employment mark would help
companies capture the business of pro-gay consumers).
But in markets with many firms, the story is very different. Even in a
world where opponents of employment equality substantially outnumber
equality advocates, there will be robust incentives for a few of the firms to
adopt the mark. To see how this works, let's imagine a stylized market con
sisting of ten hammer makers. Suppose that hammers are so uniform that
consumers are completely indifferent about the source of hammers they buy;
consumers purchase randomly, so each manufacturer gets 10% of the mar
ket. Suppose further that

5% of customers support equal employment rights

for gay men and lesbians so strongly that they will go out of their way to
138
buy hammers from the company that treats gay employees fairly. We are

See generally Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition:
I 36.
Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes 102 PsYCHOL. REV. 4 ( 1 995).
1 37.

Brown, supra note 95, at 8 12.

1 38. On one hand, this seems to be an extremely conservative assumption, since eighty-eight
percent of Americans oppose employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, accord
ing to a 2003 Gallup Poll. GEORGE GALLUP, JR., supra note 1 , at 1 60, 1 62; see also L.A. TIMES
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not assuming that 5 % would cut off their arm to further gay rights, but other
things being equal (such as price) , they would strongly prefer sellers that
promised not to discriminate. But imagine that four times as many consum
ers-20%-actively dislike or disapprove of gays (enough that they will
avoid purchasing from companies that treat gay employees fairly). The re
maining 75% of the consumers do not care one way or the other.
Now consider what happens to the first company adopting the Fair Em
ployment mark. Even if that company loses all of its business from the
antigay consumers, that difference is more than made up by the pro-gay
consumers who are induced to buy products bearing the mark. The first
mover increases from a market share of 1 0% (before using the mark) to a
1 2 . 5 % market share after adopting the Fair Employment mark. This increase
in demand results despite the fact that the company loses its share of the
antigay customers' business. The company is still getting its random tenth of
the consumers who don't care (one-tenth of 75%

=

7.5%), plus

all of the

consumers who support gay rights (5%).
How can this be-that a firm has an incentive to adopt the mark when
consumers who dislike the mark outnumber those who like it four to one?
The answer is that most of the opponents were not going to buy from the
first-adopter firm anyway. Because there were ten identical firms in the
market, the first adopter only had a 1 0% chance of getting

any consumer to

buy. From the first-adopter's perspectives, the antigay consumers fall from a
10% chance to a 0% chance of buying. But the pro-gay consumers rise from
a 10% chance to a 100% chance of buying. Because of this disproportionate
change in shifting probabilities, the buycott effect is likely to be much
stronger than the boycott effect for first-adopters in markets with many
firms. Of course, in the real world the pro-gay consumers will not go all the
way to 100% probability of buying-but the underlying idea that first
adopters will not be deterred, even in the face of considerable antigay con
sumer sentiment, still holds true.
Indeed, in our stylized example, a second firm will have an incentive to
use the mark as well. The two "marked" firms will now split the pro-gay
consumers, so each gets 1 0% of the market-7.5% (one-tenth of consumers
139
who do not care) plus 2.5 % (half the pro-gay consumers). In equilibrium,
all the firms will have the same 1 0% market shares that they began with. An
economist at Columbia piped up at a presentation of this paper and was
heard to say, "So the mark didn't make any difference." How wrong he was !
Even though market shares settle back to their pre-mark status, employment
protections for 20% of gay and lesbian employees in the industry have im
proved.
This example suggests that the Fair Employment mark could create
some very strong "first mover" advantages-if only to capture the gay-

POLL, supra note 1 . On the other hand, this group of Americans might not feel so strongly about the
issue that they would make purchasing decisions based on it.
1 39. Some of the remaining eight firms may affirmatively signal their antipathy for gays to
gain some of the antigay consumers.
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supportive consumers who remain brand-loyal even after other brands adopt
140
In a generalized version of this example, we would expect at
141
least one adopter as long as there are at least five firms.
But there is also a
the mark.

very strong incentive for another company to become the "second mover."
If we more realistically assume that the distribution of the pre-mark
market share is not random, we still see that producers with small market
shares will have incentives to adopt the mark. Assume a ten-company indus
try in which five companies have 1 5 % market shares and five companies
have 5% market shares. If one of the smaller-share companies were to adopt
the mark, it would stand to move from a 5% share to an 8.75% share-all of
the pro-gay consumers (5%) plus one-twentieth of the neutral consumers
(3.75% ). This is a sizable jump, one that would raise the company's sales by
75%. As long as one firm in the industry has less than a 20% market share,
there will be at least one firm with an economic incentive to adopt the li
cense. Additional firms will adopt as long as the resulting market share of
142
In this asymmetric market share

the adopters is less than or equal to 20%.

example, in equilibrium, four firms that start with 5% market shares will
have incentives to adopt the mark.
This example shows that the potential benefits of using the Fair Em
ployment mark could outweigh the potential costs, at least for a few
companies. But we should emphasize that the assumed four-to-one ratio of
antigay to pro-gay consumers is wildly at odds with the public attitude to
ward equal employment rights. In a world where 88% of Gallup respondents
say it is wrong to discriminate in employment on the basis of sexual orienta
tion, it is inconceivable that 20% of consumers would actively shun a
product that promised not to discriminate. Instead, the point of the exercise
is to emphasize that the threat of demand reduction does not pose an im
pediment to adoption of the mark by part of an industry. Just as smallness is
43
a spur to Delaware's innovation in corporate federalism/ theory suggests
that fringe firms with smaller market shares should lead the way with the
Fair Employment mark.
E.

Corporate Morality

Firms that have already publicly embraced nondiscrimination on the ba
sis of sexual orientation are likely adopters of the Fair Employment license.
Organizations that identify with a commitment to the cause of equality may

140. The first mover also has a better chance of selling the product to antigay consumers
before they catch on to the meaning of the mark, but we hesitate to give much weight to this sneaky
motivation.
141.
If P = proportion of pro-gay consumers, A = proportion of antigay consumers, and N =
number of firms, then it can be shown that at least one firm will adopt the license so long as (N- 1 )P
> A. The largest integer smaller than N*P/A defines the number of firms that will adopt.
1 42.
More generally (using the notation of the previous footnote), firms will continue to adopt
as long as the total market share of adopting firms is below P/(P+A).
143. Brown, supra note 95, at 8 1 9 ; Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the
Incorporation Puule, 1 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 225, 225-27 ( 1 985).
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adopt the mark not because of the foregoing recruiting or marketing bene
fits, but merely because licensing is consistent with the organization's self
conception.
While it is natural to think of employers as corporations with a single
minded profit motive, there are many nonprofit employers that by definition
pursue other goals. For example, universities are nonprofits that employ
substantial numbers of people. It should be no surprise from an organiza
tional-identity perspective that these academic nonprofits have taken a lead
in including sexual orientation in their nondiscrimination policies. Employ
ers that have included sexual orientation in their nondiscrimination policies
are therefore natural candidates for adoption of the Fair Employment mark.
A subset of these employers that have already adopted nondiscrimina
tion policies are especially likely to adopt the mark. The Human Rights
Campaign has been successful in convincing over a hundred corporations to
144
These corporations that have said they

endorse the passage of ENDA.

want to be bound by the substantive duties of ENDA would be hard-pressed
not to adopt a license imposing these same duties.
Of course, a corporation might argue that it would only be willing to
take on these duties if its competitors had to as well. After all, it is not un
reasonable to support a fifty-cent gasoline tax if borne by all, but protest if
asked to pay it individually. Given our earlier empiricism on claiming rates
under state nondiscrimination statutes, it is unlikely that fear of competitive
cost disadvantage would chill an endorser's willingness to adopt the license.
But the cost of potential boycotts might scare a firm with large market share
from becoming a first mover. Such a firm would probably prefer that the
nondiscrimination norm become mandatory to forestall loss of customers.
We believe there are strong reasons to expect a predictable subset of
employers to sign the licensing agreement. The identifiable employers
would be those who

( 1) have relatively small market shares; (2) have al

ready included sexual orientation in their nondiscrimination policies or
publicly endorsed ENDA; (3) supply cities that require public contractors
not to discriminate;

(4) are members of certifying organizations that prohibit

discrimination; or (5) are located in j urisdictions that independently prohibit
sexual orientation discrimination.
Of course, some employers might believe that the benefits of signing
outweigh its costs, but still resist because they fear "slippery slopes." If they
make this promise, they might worry that a never-ending parade of other

1 44. The list includes a variety of blue-chip stocks and household names: Agilent Technolo
gies Inc., Apple Computer Inc., AT&T, Bausch & Lomb, Ben & Jerry's Homemade Ice Cream,
Borland International, BP, Capital One Financial Corp., Charles Schwab & Co. Inc., Chubb Corp.,
Cisco Systems, Coors Brewing Co., Coming Inc., Digi-Net Syndication, Eastman Kodak, Electronic
Arts, FleetBoston Financial Corp., Trillium Asset Management, General Mills, Hewlett-Packard
Co., Hill and Knowlton, Honeywell, IBM, Imation, Intel Corp., JP Morgan Chase & Co., John Han
cock Financial Services Inc., Kaiser Permanente, Levi Strauss & Co., Louis Dreyfus Corp., MFS
Investment Management, Microsoft, Millipore Corp., Nationwide, Nike Inc., Oracle Corp., Pruden
tial Insurance Co., Quark, SGI, Shell Oil Co., Software Spectrum Inc., State Street Corp., The
Quaker Oats Company, Triarc Beverage Group, Verizon Communications, Wainwright Bank, World
span L.P., Xerox, Yahoo Inc. Human Rights Campaign Foundation, supra note 45.
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certification promises will follow, with pressure applied to sign each one.
This argument, like others, will have different salience for different employ
ers. The same slippery slope argument could be used to resist including
additional categories in a firm's nondiscrimination policy: if an employer
includes sexual orientation, it will then be pressured to include gender iden
tity (or attractiveness, or weight). But employers that have been willing to
take on this slippery slope risk in including sexual orientation in their non
discrimination policies are more likely to be willing to take on some
additional slippery slope risk with regard to legal commitments not to dis
criminate.
IV. RESPONDING TO CRITICISMS
The last Part was concerned with whether too few employers would sign
the licensing agreement. Here we ask the converse question: will too many
employers sign? Specifically, this Part takes on four different criticisms con
cerning privatization of civil rights duties. Could it be that giving employers
a convenient mechanism to promise not to discriminate somehow hurts the
cause of employment equality?
A.

Reducing Demand for a Statutory Prohibition

As an initial matter, we should consider whether the Fair Employment
mark might take the wind out of the sails of the push for passage of ENDA
itself. We have argued for the mark as an incremental strategy that could be
used as a step in the process of compelling all employers not to discriminate
on the basis of sexual orientation. But a pervasive concern with incremental
ism is the possibility that it will cause a movement to stall out short of its
ultimate goal. The privatization of ENDA duties might work as a substitute,
rather than a complement, to national passage of legislation protecting les
bian and gay people in employment.
This concern recently drove the leading marriage equality group in Con
necticut, Loves Makes a Family, to oppose a civil-union bill for same-sex
couples. Although the civil-union bill would immediately grant same-sex
couples all of the legal rights of marriage (and represent the first time that a
145
state legislature free from court order had conferred full benefits),
the
group worried that legalizing civil unions would take the "wind out of the
146
The group's executive direc

sails" of the equal marriage rights movement.

tor, Anne Stanback, told the joint judiciary committee of the General

1 45 .

California has come close with domestic partnership, however.

1 46.
Daniela Altimari, Lawmakers Favor Civil Unions, Despite Objections, HARTFORD
COURANT, Feb. 8, 2005, at B l ("Stanback said that she would rather the legislature do nothing than
approve civil unions, which she said aren't a 'stepping stone' on the road to gay marriage but a
stopping point in the debate. Since Vermont enacted civil unions, its legislature now has no interest
in revisiting gay marriage, she said.").
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Assembly that she feared a civil-union bill would not be a stepping stone to
147
marriage but a stopping point.
As a theoretical matter, we might be agnostic about whether voluntary
adoption by a portion of employers would increase or decrease demand for a
mandatory ENDA-like statute. We might expect a snowball effect as mo
mentum grows behind employment protections for gay and lesbian people.
But from a public-choice perspective, if adoption of the mark satisfied the
demands of the most ardent proponents of nondiscrimination, the Fair Em
ployment mark could reduce the pressure for a federal statute. City and state
laws prohibiting discrimination could have a similar impact. Charles Shipan
and Craig Volden have empirically measured these competing snowball
versus-pressure valve effects with regard to the diffusion of city antismok
ing laws. 148 In this context, they concluded that the "snowball effect"
dominated-states were more likely to pass antismoking legislation if cities
had already enacted similar legislation.
We think a snowball effect is likely to dominate here as well. The thirst
of gay rights proponents will not be quenched by partial, voluntary adop
tion. We imagine that employers will adopt the mark as a beacon to other
like-minded employers. Ultimately, the covered entities will want their
competitors to be covered as well. This is especially true once there is suffi
cient entry into the market to dilute away the initial advantage of first-mover
licensees.
In our stylized market of ten hammer manufacturers, the first adopter in
creased its market share. This sole adopter would not benefit from the
passage of ENDA. But in that example, the adoption of the mark by a sec
ond firm absorbed the economic advantage and returned all ten firms to their
ex ante market shares. It is at this point that adopters as well as non-adopters
would welcome the legislation that "forces" them to do what they would
want to do anyway-hire the most qualified individual. Moreover, the dem
onstration benefits of the mark that we described above are benefits that
lower the cost of enacting. Public support for the law, low litigation rates,
and some record of how courts interpret the statutory language are elements
that could enhance the "snowball" impact of the law.
When push comes to shove, it is difficult to tum down the immediate
"bird in the hand" benefits of incremental progress. Indeed, returning to the
Connecticut civil-union debate, it should not surprise us that Love Makes a
Family ultimately softened its stance on civil unions. When a civil-union bill
was eventually voted out of committee, the group chose not to oppose it-

147. Id. Stanback initially testified that, if a civil union bill was brought up for a vote, Love
Makes a Family (LMF) would lobby for its defeat. LMF subsequently withdrew this threat when
members decided that defeat of the civil union bill would do more harm than good, and Anne Stan
back declared it a "great day" when Connecticut Governor Jodi Rell signed the civil union bill into
law. Gregory B. Hladky, Rell Signs Civil Union Legislation into Law, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, Apr.
2 1 , 2005, at A l .
1 48. Charles R . Shipan & Craig Volden, Policy Diffusion from Cities to States: Antismoking
Laws in the U.S. (Jan. 3 1 , 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/
leo/papers/shipan. pdf.
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even as it continued to press for marriage equality. It is similarly difficult to
oppose an effort to give gay and lesbian employees an enforceable nondis
crimination promise-even if federal legislation is the ultimate goal.
B.

Contingent Demandfor a Statutory Prohibition

A related concern is that the mark might promote a kind of

conditional

demand for statutory prohibitions. Think of this as the dark side of the dem
onstration benefit. The experience of the licensees provides legislatures with
valuable information. But what happens if this information is bad news?
What happens if we find that

(1)

few employers adopt the mark ;

(2)

there is

an unexpectedly large amount of litigation (leading chastened employers to
149
terminate their licenses) ; or (3) "activist " judges and juries
radically ex
pand the contours of liability (also leading chastened employers to terminate
their licenses)?
The demonstration effects of the mark could make legislators' support
for civil rights empirically contingent. The norm of nondiscrimination be
comes a hostage to fortune. Some might argue that it is wrong to hitch our
wagon to such an uncertain star.
We disagree. This is a situation where more information is a good
150
Let's consider the list in reverse order. If judges are misconstruing

thing.

the intended duties of ENDA, it is appropriate for legislators to take these
precedents into account in redrafting the statute. If the mark leads to unex
pectedly high litigation rates, Congress (and society) might learn that there
is more disparate treatment on the basis of sexual orientation than we had
earlier perceived. However, if the litigation spike is caused by frivolous or
unsubstantiated claims (reflected in high rates of summary judgment or
dismissal for failure to state a claim), we think it is again appropriate for
legislators to consider these effects in deciding whether to redraft the statute.
Finally, we believe that even if firms fail to adopt the mark, this does not
necessarily send a dire negative signal. The mark is a sufficiently novel idea
that lack of adoption can be explained away by a number of neutral reasons,
including (misguided) narrow self-interest.
And if history is any indication, the news about the mark will not be
bad. One of the most startling things about some gay rights victories is how
149. In 1 99 1 , Congress amended Title Vil to create the right to trial by jury and to entitle
plaintiffs to recover compensatory and punitive damages, within certain caps based on the size of
the employer. See Civil Rights Act of 1 99 1 , 42 U.S.C. § 1 98 l a(c)( l ) (2000) . Just as Title VII cases
can be tried to a jury, so too ENDA claims seeking compensatory or punitive damages would almost
surely be subject to jury trial. Section l 2(b) of ENDA makes "the procedures and remedies applica
ble to a claim alleged by an individual for a violation of this Act" the same as "the procedures and
remedies applicable for a violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1 964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et
seq.)." S. 1 705, 1 08th Cong. § 1 2(b) (2003). As is true in civil cases generally, the jury trial may be
waived if no demand is made for a jury or if a demand has been made but all parties subsequently
agree to waiver. See FED. R. C1v. P. 38(d); id. 39(a)( l ).
1 50.
But see Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80
VA. L. REv. 323 ( 1 994); Ian Ayres & Barry Nalebuff, Common Knowledge as a Barrier to Negotia
tion, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1 63 1 ( 1 997); and BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DoLLARS
(2002), for circumstances in which non-transparency can promote social welfare.
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little they change the world for most people. Marriage was extended to
same-sex couples in Massachusetts (as well as some Western European
countries) and the sky did not fall. Openly gay and lesbian service members
were welcomed into the armed forces of the European Union and we see
business as usual (even when those forces cooperate with their American
colleagues). The experience of the seventeen jurisdictions that already pro
hibit private employment discrimination shows us that adoption of the mark
is not likely to open a Pandora's box of litigation or unwarranted claims.
This is a bet that proponents of gay rights should be willing to make.
C.

Commodifying Equality

A third concern about the mark is that it could cause the concept of
equality to slip from being an inalienable right to a commodity which em
ployers guarantee only if the cost is low. Our earlier economic appeals for
adoption might offend some who believe that right-minded employers
should support nondiscrimination simply because it is a basic human right.
To commodify the value of equality is to suggest an invidious economic
calculus.
ers.

To these concerns, we plead guilty. And we confess: we are commodifi
But we are also pragmatists. We have the strong sense that

nondiscrimination in employment is consistent with robust capitalism. Once
people see that employment equality does not undermine profitability, it will
be very hard to take away. To our minds, securing this basic right a few
years earlier is worth the psychological cost of commodification.
In many ways, the ship of commodification has already sailed. When
HRC tries to convince employers to endorse ENDA or adopt the HRC

100%

mark, its arguments in large part tum on the economic benefits, especially in
recruiting talented employees. And this is as it should be. It is wrong to
think that "corporate morality" is an oxymoron, but it is naive to think that
all moral arguments must scrupulously ignore their impact on a decision
maker's profitability.
D.

Closeting Equality

A final concern about the mark is that it will not only commodify civil
rights norms, but also privatize the norms in ways that set back the larger
cause. Gay, lesbian, and bisexual people, as well as gay rights scholars,
know well the dangers of the closet. Or the animus that can drive this de
mand: "We don't care what gay people do in the privacy of their own

bedrooms, just don't ask us to recognize them in the public sphere." Critics
could complain that the mark responds to an analogous (and equally prob
lematic) demand: "We don't care what you companies do for gay people in
the privacy of your own boardroom, just don't ask us to recognize it in the
public sphere." Instead of framing nondiscrimination as a public value, the
mark may contribute to a reconceptualization of it as merely a private choice
upon which the government should not tread.
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Although worthy of consideration, this closeting concern is unlikely to
arise. The adoption of the mark is itself a public act. While we allow licen
sees to practice the mark selectively, we as licensors-much like HRC with
regard to corporate endorsers of ENDA-will maintain on the Internet a
151
Revealing the complete list of adopters also

public database of adopters.

reveals those employers that have not adopted. So both the adoption and
non-adoption of the mark become common knowledge. While a corporation
could respond that the contours of its employment promises are private, the
social meaning of certification marks is necessarily public.
And as argued earlier, the likely impact of private adoptions is to in
crease the demand for public mandates. The net result is that massive
licensing of the mark would not denigrate equality to merely a private cor
porate choice shielded from public purview. Instead, nondiscrimination in
the shadow of many adoptions would increasingly fuel demands for univer
sal, mandatory norms.
CONCLUSION

This Article strives to do more than show the possibility of privatizing
ENDA. It is performative as well. The Fair Employment mark now exists
and is open for business. The licensing agreement in the Appendix can be
copied, signed, and faxed to us by any employer and it will immediately
take effect. (The signed and completed agreement can be faxed to Ian Ayres
at 203-432-4769.) Or employers can go to www.fairemploymentmark. org
and license the mark with just a few clicks of the mouse. With the publica
tion of this Article, we hereby announce a formal licensing campaign. We
intend to take the descriptive theory of Part ill and use it to target employers
that are more likely to be willing to adopt the mark. We hope within a year
and a half to have

100,000 workers covered.

Although this Article has been a sustained attempt at defending and ex
plicating the feasibility of the Fair Employment mark as a specific means of
privatizing ENDA, the Article in a broader sense is a call for more explicit
contracting. The earlier movement for non-binding policies was itself a use
ful form of incrementalism. Even these non-binding or probabilistically
binding policies signaled the employer's viewpoint that homosexuality was
not

malum in se. The policies at a minimum conveyed the employer's aspi

ration. These mere words strongly suggested that one's sexual orientation
would not be per se disqualifying. At the very least, they allowed the possi
bility of nonlegal enforcement. An employer that included sexual orientation
in its nondiscrimination policy but nonetheless countenanced blatant dis
crimination might be publicly ridiculed. But the time to take the next
incremental step is now.
Instead of asking for nondiscrimination policies, we should begin asking
for nondiscrimination

promises. We should demand more than hortatory

claims of nondiscrimination. If nondiscrimination means anything, it should

151.

See Human Rights Campaign Foundation, supra note 45.
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mean that an employer legally commits not to engage in disparate treatment.
The current policies are too close to "cheap talk" that can actually border on
fraud. An applicant can read the pretty words of nondiscrimination and then
be surprised to learn that, since she was never in privity with the employer,
she has no cause of action. Our claim is simply that these nondiscrimination
rights should now have legal remedies.
The next time you are at a meeting and you hear your own employer ex
tol its nondiscrimination policy, you should speak up and ask, "Are you
promising not to discriminate?" We are not posing a hypothetical. We call
upon our academic readers to challenge their deans and university presidents
(as well as the nonprofit boards on which they sit): "Is this institution will
ing to promise not to discriminate?" What are they going to say in response?
"We take our nondiscrimination policy very seriously, but no, we're not
152
willing to promise not to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation."
We are about to have a test-and you, gentle reader, are one of the subj ects.

1 52. As we script this conversation, we might suggest you make this retort: "And would you
opt out of Title VII generally, given the chance?"
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APPENDIX
LICENSING A GREEMENT FOR THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT MARK

This AGREEMENT is made by and between:
Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, individuals residing in New Haven,
CT
"Licensor"),
(hereinafter
and
(hereinafter "Licensee"),
[please insert name of employer/firm]
WHEREAS, Licensor has devised a Fair Employment Mark (hereinafter
"the Mark"), a copy of which is attached as Attachment A to this agreement,
and has developed goodwill associated with the Mark and the names "Fair
Employment Mark," and "fairemploymentmark.org."
WHEREAS, Licensee and Licensor desire to enter into an agreement per
taining to the Mark whereby Licensee shall have the right to use the Mark;
WHEREAS Licensee desires to privately commit to non-discrimination as
defined in the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) as proposed in
'h
"
S. 1705, 108 Cong., 1 Sess. (2003), which is attached as Attachment B to
this agreement.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual agreements contained
herein and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and suffi
ciency of which is hereby acknowledged, Licensor and Licensee agree as
follows:
1.

GRANT OF LICENSE. Licensor hereby grants to Licensee a license
to use the Mark and all goodwill associated therewith as embodied by
the term "the Mark", including, but not limited to, using the Mark in Li
censee's products, services, and advertising materials.

2.

TERM. The term of the license herein granted shall be five years ("the
Term"), and renewed automatically upon for another five years at the
end of every previous Term unless otherwise terminated by either party
as set forth in Paragraph 13.

3.

CONSIDERATION. In exchange for Licensor licensing the Mark to
Licensee, Licensee promises to abide by the standards of fair employ
ment defined in the next paragraph.

4.

STANDARDS OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT. Licensee promises not to

engage in the following employment practices:

(1) "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to the compensation,
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terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the individual, be
cause of such individual's sexual orientation;" ENDA, S.

1 705, §

4(a)( l ) (attached hereto) or
(2) "to limit, segregate, or classify the employees or applicants for em
ployment of the employer in any way that would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment or otherwise adversely affect the
status of the individual as an employee, because of such individual's
sexual orientation;" ENDA, S. 1705, §4 (a)(2) (attached hereto)

(3)

to discriminate against any individual because of the sexual orienta

tion of the individual "in admission to, or employment in, any program
established to provide apprenticeship or other training;" ENDA, S.
1705, §4(d) (attached hereto)
(4) to discriminate against an individual because such individual op
posed any of the employment practices described in subsections ( 1)
through

(3),

"or because such individual made a charge, testified, as

sisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing" concerned with this License. ENDA, S. 1 705, §5 (attached
hereto)
The employment practices described in any of subsections (1) through

(3)

"shall be considered to include an action described in that subsec

tion, taken against an individual based on the sexual orientation of a
person with whom the individual associates or has associated." ENDA,
S. 1 705, §4 (e) (attached hereto)
5.

THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES. Licensee and Licensor agree to
designate as express third-party beneficiaries of this agreement all per
sons and entities that would be entitled to sue if ENDA were in effect
(including governmental civil rights enforcement agencies). In particu
lar, Licensee and Licensor designate as express third-party beneficiaries
all persons who are or have been employed by the Licensee or applied
for employment with the Licensee during the term of the license. The
Licensee and Licensor intend that these third-party beneficiaries will
have the right to sue the Licensee for any breach of this agreement and
have a legal right to the same remedies (including damages and injunc
tive relief) to which they would be entitled if ENDA were in effect.

6.

DISPARATE IMPACT AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION. Disparate
impact claims may not be brought under this License agreement. The
Licensee by signing this agreement does not promise to engage in af
firmative action on the basis of sexual orientation, and affirmative
action for a breach of this agreement may not be imposed. See ENDA,
S. 1705, § §4(f), 12(d) (attached hereto)
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BENEFITS. This License shall not be construed to require the provi

sion of employee benefits to an individual for the benefit of the
domestic partner of such individual.

8.

COOPERATION. In exchange for the license granted herein, Licensee

agrees to cooperate reasonably with the Licensor's requests for materi
als useful to Licensor in maintenance and renewal of the Mark,
including but not limited to, specimens of use of the Mark in connection
with Licensee's offering of goods and services, and lists of goods and
services offered by the Licensee in connection with the Mark.
9.

OWNERSHIP OF THE MARK. Licensee acknowledges that Licen

sor is the owner of the Mark and that all of Licensee's use of the Mark
and any goodwill established in association with Licensee's use of the
Mark shall inure to the benefit of Licensor. Apart from actions of fraud,
misrepresentation and the like, Licensee shall not contest or deny the
ownership or validity of the Mark or the title of the Licensor thereto.
10. LIMITED WARRANTY. Licensor hereby warrants that it has no ac

tual knowledge of any trademark, service mark, collective mark or
certification mark rights of any third-party which would impair Licen
see's use of the Mark. Licensor further warrants that it has no actual
knowledge of any adversarial proceeding or other license concerning
the Mark. Licensor does not warrant that the Mark is a valid certifica
tion mark recognized by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
11. CERTIFICATION. Licensor does not certify that Licensee in fact

abides by the Standards of Fair Employment. But Licensor certifies that
Licensee by signing this agreement ( 1) has promised to abide by the
Standards of Fair Employment and (2) has granted third-party benefici
ary rights to the individuals and entities enumerated above to enforce
breaches of the Licensee's promise to abide by the Standards of Fair
Employment.
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12. INFRINGEMENT BY THIRD PARTIES. The parties acknowledge
their joint interest and obligation in policing the Mark and of notifying
the other in the event that any potential infringement is found. Specifi
cally, Licensee and Licensor agree promptly to give notice to the other
of any infringement of the Mark or any threatened litigation or proceed
ing involving the Mark. Licensor shall not be obliged to take any action
whatsoever against third parties who are infringing or believed to be in
fringing the Mark except as Licensor, in its sole discretion, shall deem
advisable. Any action taken by Licensor on its own initiative shall be
solely within its discretion, control and expense. If Licensee makes a
written request to Licensor to take action against an alleged third-party
infringer, Licensor may, in its discretion, elect not to take any action
against such third-party infringer. In this event, or if Licensor does not
respond to the aforementioned written request in seven (7) days, Licen
see, at its sole cost, control, discretion and expense, shall be free to
undertake any action against such a third-party infringer. In such an
event, Licensee shall have the right to select its own counsel and Licen
see shall keep Licensor completely informed of all developments.
Except as set forth above, Licensee shall not institute any legal or ad
ministrative proceeding against any third-party with respect to the Mark
without the prior written consent of Licensor. Licensor and Licensee
may agree to permit themselves to be named in any adversarial action
reasonably required to police and protect the Mark. In the event that Li
censor does agree to participate in an adversarial proceeding instituted
by the Licensee, the Licensee shall indemnify the Licensor. Licensor
and Licensee agree to cooperate fully with the other in any defense or
assertion of rights associated with the Mark.
13. TERMINATION. The Licensee for any reason can immediately termi
nate this agreement prior to the normal expiration of the Term by
sending a written notice of termination by mail to the Licensor. The Li
censor can terminate this agreement prior to the normal expiration of
the Term if the Licensee shall be in breach of any material obligation set
forth herein. Termination by the Licensor shall be effected by delivery
of notice to the Licensee which notice expressly and in detail sets forth
the basis for termination. This Agreement will terminate sixty

(60)

days

after the Licensor shall send by mail notice of termination.
14. ENFORCEMENT. The Licensor waives any and all rights to sue Li
censee for violation of the Standards of Fair Employment, but retains
the right to sue the Licensee for unauthorized use of the Mark (includ
ing use of the Mark after termination of the license). Third-party
beneficiaries have the exclusive rights to sue the Licensee for violation
of the Standards of Fair Employment. Any lawsuit by a third-party
beneficiary for violation of the Standards of Fair Employment shall be
filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged violating em
ployment practice occurred.

June 2006]

Mark(et)ing Nondiscrimination

1 699

15. REMEDIES. The remedies applicable to a claim alleged by a third
party beneficiary for a violation of the Standards of Fair Employment
shall include all "remedies applicable for a violation of title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.)." ENDA S. 1 705,
§ 1 2(b)(l) (attached hereto). All specific remedies provided for in this
Agreement shall be cumulative and shall not be exclusive of one an
other or of any other remedies available in law or in equity. The failure
to insist upon strict performance of any of the covenants or terms hereof
to be performed shall not be construed as a waiver of such covenants or
terms. Should either the Licensee or the Licensor file litigation against
the other party to enforce the terms of this Agreement, then the non
breaching party in such litigation as determined by a final, non
appealable order of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be entitled to
receive from the breaching party all of its costs and expenses in such
litigation including reasonable attorneys' fees.

16. ENTIRE AGREEMENT. This Agreement constitutes the entire agree
ment between the parties solely with respect to the licensing of the
Mark. The Agreement supersedes any prior agreements or understand
ings, whether written or oral, between or among the parties regarding
the licensing of the Mark. The parties agree that this Agreement may
not be amended or changed in any way except by written instruments
signed by each of the parties hereto.

17. CHOICE OF LAW AND FORUM. Except to the extent governed by
the Lanham Act ( 1 5 U.S.C. §§ 1 0 5 1 et seq.), this Agreement shall be in
terpreted and construed pursuant to the law of the State of Connecticut
without regard to its conflict of laws. The Standards of Fair Employ
ment of this license shall be interpreted in cases of ambiguity to impose
the same duties on the Licensor as would apply if the version of ENDA
attached as Attachment B had been enacted by Congress and was in
force. Any lawsuit filed in connection with this Agreement by either li
censor or licensee against the other shall be in a court located in the
State of Connecticut. Any lawsuit filed in connect with this Agreement
by a third-party beneficiary shall be in a court located in the state where
the alleged violation of the Standards of Fair Employment occurred.

18. ASSIGNMENTS AND BINDING EFFECT. Licensee shall not di
rectly or indirectly assign, sub-license, pledge, encumber, grant or
otherwise transfer any of its rights conferred by this Agreement. This
Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of each of the
parties hereto and each of their respective authorized purchasers, suc
cessors and assigns.

19. WAIVER. The waiver by any party of a breach or provision of this
Agreement shall not operate or be construed as a waiver of any subse
quent breach by such other party.
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20. SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this Agreement is held to be
illegal, invalid, or unenforceable under any law, rule, or regulation, such
provision shall be fully severable and this Agreement shall be construed
and enforced as if such illegal, invalid, or unenforceable provision never
comprised a part hereof. The remaining provisions of this Agreement
shall remain in full force and effect, and shall not be affected by the il
legal, invalid, or unenforceable provision or by its severance herefrom.

21. RECITALS AND HEADINGS. The recitals contained in this Agree
ment are an integral part hereof and this Agreement shall be construed
in light of such recitals. The captions and headings contained herein are
for convenient reference only and shall not be construed as a part
hereof.

22. COUNTERPART AGREEMENTS. This Agreement may be executed
by each of the parties in separate counterpart and have the same force
and effect as if it had been executed as a single document.

23. NOTICE. Any notice or other communication required, contemplated
or permitted under the terms of this Agreement must be given in writing
by

U.S.

post or by overnight courier such as DHL, Federal Express, or

Express Mail. Notice shall be deemed effective on the date sent. All no
tices or formal communications pursuant to this Agreement shall be sent
to the parties as follows:
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To Licensor:

1 70 1

Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown
1 27 Wall Street
New Haven, CT 065 1 1

To Licensee:

[insert name and mailing address]
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement by

and through their properly authorized signatories effective as of the date
indicated above.
Licensor S!gnatures:

� i=:
Dated:

'/j/ftjo 'i

Licensee Signature:

[authorized signature]

[print name]

[print title]
Dated:

_
_
_
_
_
_
_

Approximate number of employees currently employed by Licensee:

Please fax the completed and signed agreement to Ian Ayres at (203) 4324769.
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1 08th CONGRESS

1. 1 st Session
S. 1705

To prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
October 2,

2003

Mr. KENNEDY (for himself, Mr. JEFFORDS, Mr. CHAFEE, Mr.
LIEBERMAN, Mr. AKA.KA, Mr. BAUCUS, Mr. BAYH, Mr. BIDEN, Mr.
BINGAMAN, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. BREAUX, Ms. CANTWELL, Mr.
CARPER, Mrs. CLINTON, Ms. COLLINS, Mr. CORZINE, Mr. DASCHLE,
Mr. DAYTON, Mr. DODD, Mr. DORGAN, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. EDWARDS,
Mr. FEINGOLD, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. GRAHAM of Florida, Mr.
HARKIN, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. KERRY, Mr. KOHL, Ms. LANDRIEU, Mr.
LAUTENBERG, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. LEVIN, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mrs.
MURRAY, Mr. NELSON of Florida, Mr. REED, Mr. REID, Mr.
SARBANES, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. SMITH, Mr. SPECTER, Ms.
STABENOW, and Mr. WYDEN) introduced the following bill; which was
read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions

A BILL

To prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the 'Employment Non-Discrimination Act of
2003' .
SEC. 2 . PURPOSES.

The purposes of this Act are--

(1) to provide a comprehensive Federal prohibition of employ
ment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation;
(2) to provide meaningful and effective remedies for employ
ment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation; and
(3) to invoke congressional powers, including the powers to
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enforce the 1 4th amendment to the Constitution, and to regulate
interstate commerce and provide for the general welfare pursuant
to section 8 of article I of the Constitution, in order to prohibit
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
SEC.

3. DEFINITIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL- In this Act:
(1) COMMISSION- The term 'Commission' means the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.
(2) COVERED ENTITY- The term 'covered entity' means an
employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor
management committee.
(3) EMPLOYEE(A) IN GENERAL- The term 'employee' means-(i) an employee (as defined in section 70 1 (t) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e(t));
(ii) a Presidential appointee or State employee
to which section 302(a)(l) of the Government
Employee Rights Act of 199 1 (42 U.S.C.
2000e- 1 6b(a)( l )) applies;
(iii) a covered employee, as defined in section
1 0 1 of the Congressional Accountability Act of
1995 (2 U.S.C. 1301) or section 4 1 l (c) of title
3, United States Code; or
(iv) an employee or applicant to which section
7 1 7(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42
U.S.C. 2000e- 16(a)) applies.
(B) EXCEPTION- The provisions of this Act that apply
to an employee or individual shall not apply to a volun
teer who receives no compensation.
(4) EMPLOYER- The term 'employer' means-(A) a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
(as defined in section 701 (h) of the Civil Rights Act of
1 964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e(h)) who has 1 5 or more employ
ees (as defined in subparagraphs (A)(i) and (B) of
paragraph (3)) for each working day in each of 20 or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calen
dar year, and any agent of such a person, but does not
include a bona fide private membership club (other than
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a labor organization) that is exempt from taxation under
section 50 1 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986;
(B) an employing authority to which section 302(a)(l)
of the Government Employee Rights Act of 1991 ap
plies;
(C) an employing office, as defined in section 101 of the
Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 or section
4 1 1 (c) of title 3, United States Code; or
(D) an entity to which section 7 17(a) of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 applies.
(5) EMPLOYMENT AGENCY- The term 'employment agency'
has the meaning given the term in section 701 (c) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e(c)).
(6) LABOR ORGANIZATION- The term 'labor organization'
has the meaning given the term in section 701 (d) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e(d)).
(7) PERSON- The term ' person' has the meaning given the term
in section 70 l (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1 964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e(a)).
(8) RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION- The term 'religious organi
zation' means-(A) a religious corporation, association, or society; or
(B) a school, college, university, or other educational in
stitution or institution of learning, if-(i) the institution is in whole or substantial part
controlled, managed, owned, or supported by a
religion, religious corporation, association, or
society; or
(ii) the curriculum of the institution is directed
toward the propagation of a religion.

(9) SEXUAL ORIENTATION- The term 'sexual orientation'
means homosexuality, bisexuality, or heterosexuality, whether
the orientation is real or perceived.
(10) STATE- The term ' State' has the meaning given the term in
section 70 1 (i) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e(i)).
(b) APPLICATION OF DEFINITIONS- For purposes of this section, a
reference in section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964--
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( 1 ) to an employee or an employer shall be considered to refer to
an employee (as defined in paragraph (3)) or an employer (as de
fined in paragraph (4)), respectively, except as provided in
paragraph (2); and
(2) to an employer in subsection (f) of that section shall be con
sidered to refer to an employer (as defined in paragraph (4)(A)).
SEC. 4. DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED.

(a) EMPLOYER PRACTICES- It shall be an unlawful employment prac
tice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or oth
erwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to the
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of
the individual, because of such individual's sexual orientation; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify the employees or applicants for
employment of the employer in any way that would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment or otherwise ad
versely affect the status of the individual as an employee,
because of such individual's sexual orientation.
(b) EMPLOYMENT AGENCY PRACTICES- It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer
for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual be
cause of the sexual orientation of the individual or to classify or refer for
employment any individual on the basis of the sexual orientation of the
individual.
(c) LABOR ORGANIZATION PRACTICES- It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for a labor organization-( 1 ) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to
discriminate against, any individual because of the sexual orien
tation of the individual;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants
for membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for em
ployment any individual, in any way that would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment, or would limit such
employment or otherwise adversely affect the status of the indi
vidual as an employee or as an applicant for employment,
because of such individual's sexual orientation; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an individual in violation of this section.
(d) TRAINING PROGRAMS- It shall be an unlawful employment prac
tice for any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, in-
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eluding on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individ
ual because of the sexual orientation of the individual in admission to, or
employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or
other training.
(e) ASSOCIATION- An unlawful employment practice described in any
of subsections (a) through (d) shall be considered to include an action de
scribed in that subsection, taken against an individual based on the sexual
orientation of a person with whom the individual associates or has associ
ated.
(f) DISPARATE IMPACT- Only disparate treatment claims may be
brought under this Act.
SEC.

5. RETALIATION PROHIBITED.

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a covered entity to dis
criminate against an individual because such individual opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this Act, or because
such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this Act.
SEC.

6. BENEFITS.

This Act does not apply to the provision of employee benefits to an indi
vidual for the benefit of the domestic partner of such individual.
SEC.

7. COLLECTION OF STATISTICS PROHIBITED.

The Commission shall not collect statistics on sexual orientation from
covered entities, or compel the collection of such statistics by covered en
tities.
SEC.
8.
QUOTAS
PROHIBITED.

AND

PREFERENTIAL

TREATMENT

(a) QUOTAS- A covered entity shall not adopt or implement a quota on
the basis of sexual orientation.
(b) PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT- A covered entity shall not give
preferential treatment to an individual on the basis of sexual orientation.
(c) ORDERS AND CONSENT DECREES- Notwithstanding any other
provision of this Act, an order or consent decree entered for a violation of
this Act may not include a quota, or preferential treatment to an individ
ual, based on sexual orientation.
SEC.

9. RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION.

This Act shall not apply to a religious organization.
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SEC. 10. NONAPPLICATION TO MEMBERS OF THE ARMED
FORCES; VETERANS' PREFERENCES.

(a) ARMED FORCES( 1 ) EMPLOYMENT- In this Act, the term 'employment' does
not apply to the relationship between the United States and
members of the Armed Forces.
(2) ARMED FORCES- In paragraph ( 1 ), the term 'Armed
Forces' means the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and
Coast Guard.
(b) VETERANS ' PREFERENCES- This Act does not repeal or modify
any Federal, State, territorial, or local law creating a special right or pref
erence concerning employment for a veteran.
SEC. 1 1. CONSTRUCTION.

(a) EMPLOYER RULES AND POLICIES- Nothing in this Act shall be
construed to prohibit a covered entity from enforcing rules and policies, if
the rules or policies are designed for, and uniformly applied to, all indi
viduals regardless of sexual orientation.
(b) ASSOCIATION- Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit
any association, or infringe upon any right of association, guaranteed by
the first amendment
to the Constitution, of any nonprofit, voluntary membership organization.
SEC. 12. ENFORCEMENT.

(a) ENFORCEMENT POWERS- With respect to the administration and
enforcement of this Act in the case of a claim alleged by an individual for
a violation of this Act-( 1 ) the Commission shall have the same powers as the Commis
sion has to administer and enforce-(A) title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e et seq.); or
(B) sections 302 and 304 of the Government Employee
Rights Act of 199 1 (42 U.S.C. 2000e- 16b and 2000e1 6c);
in the case of a claim alleged by such individual for a violation
of such title, or of section 302(a)( l ) of the Government Em
ployee Rights Act of 1 99 1 (42 U.S.C. 2000e- 16b(a)( l )),
respectively;
(2) the Librarian of Congress shall have the same powers as the
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Librarian of Congress has to administer and enforce title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.) in the case
of a claim alleged by such individual for a violation of such title;
(3) the Board (as defined in section 1 0 1 of the Congressional
Accountability Act of 1 995 (2 U.S.C. 130 1 )) shall have the same
powers as the Board has to administer and enforce the Congres
sional Accountability Act of 1 995 (2 U.S.C. 1301 et seq.) in the
case of a claim alleged by such individual for a violation of sec
tion 201(a)( l ) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 1 3 1 l (a)(l ));
(4) the Attorney General shall have the same powers as the At
torney General has to administer and enforce-(A) title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1 964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e et seq.); or
(B) sections 302 and 304 of the Government Employee
Rights Act of 199 1 (42 U.S.C. 2000e- 1 6b and 2000e1 6c);
in the case of a claim alleged by such individual for a violation
of such title, or of section 302(a)( l ) of the Government Em
ployee Rights Act of 199 1 (42 U.S.C. 2000e- 16b(a)( l )),
respectively;
(5) the President, the Commission, and the Merit Systems Pro
tection Board shall have the same powers as the President, the
Commission, and the Board, respectively, have to administer and
enforce chapter 5 of title 3, United States Code, in the case of a
claim alleged by such individual for a violation of section 4 1 1 of
such title;
(6) a court of the United States shall have the same jurisdiction
and powers as the court has to enforce-(A) title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e et seq.) in the case of a claim alleged by such in
dividual for a violation of such title;
(B) sections 302 and 304 of the Government Employee
Rights Act of 1 99 1 (42 U.S.C. 2000e- 16b and 2000e16c) in the case of a claim alleged by such individual for
a violation of section 302(a)( l ) of such Act (42 U.S.C.
2000e- 16b(a)(l));
(C) the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (2
U.S.C. 1301 et seq.) in the case of a claim alleged by
such individual for a violation of section 20 l (a)( l ) of
such Act (2 U.S.C. 1 3 1 l (a)( l )); and
(D) chapter 5 of title 3, United States Code, in the case
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of a claim alleged by such individual for a violation of
section 4 1 1 of such title.
(b) PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES- The procedures and remedies ap
plicable to a claim alleged by an individual for a violation of this Act are-( 1 ) the procedures and remedies applicable for a violation of title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1 964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.) in
the case of a claim alleged by such individual for a violation of
such title;
(2) the procedures and remedies applicable for a violation of sec
tion 302(a)( l ) of the Government Employee Rights Act of 199 1
(42 U.S.C. 2000e- 1 6b(a)( l )) in the case of a claim alleged by
such individual for a violation of such section;
(3) the procedures and remedies applicable for a violation of sec
tion 201(a)( l ) of the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995
(2 U.S.C. 1 3 1 1 (a)(l)) in the case of a claim alleged by such indi
vidual for a violation of such section; and
(4) the procedures and remedies applicable for a violation of sec
tion 41 1 of title 3, United States Code, in the case of a claim
alleged by such individual for a violation of such section.
(c) OTHER APPLICABLE PROVISIONS- With respect to a claim al
leged by a covered employee (as defined in section 1 0 1 of the
Congressional Accountability Act of
1995 (2 U.S.C. 1 30 1)) for a violation of this Act, title ill of the Congressional
Accountability Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 138 1 et seq.) shall apply in the same
manner as such title applies with respect to a claim alleged by such a covered
employee for a violation of section 20 l (a)( l ) of such Act (2 U.S.C.
1 3 1 1 (a)( l )).
(d) PROHIBITION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION- Notwithstanding any
other provision of this section, affirmative action for a violation of this
Act may not be imposed. Nothing in this section shall prevent the grant
ing of relief to any individual who suffers a violation of such individual's
rights provided in this Act.
SEC. 13. STATE AND FEDERAL IMMUNITY.

(a) STATE IMMUNITY- A State shall not be immune under the 1 1th
amendment to the Constitution from a suit described in subsection (b) and
brought in a Federal court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this
Act.
(b) REMEDIES FOR STATE EMPLOYEES
( 1 ) IN GENERAL-
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(A) WAIVER- A State's receipt or use of Federal finan
cial assistance for any program or activity of a State
shall constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity, under
the 1 1 th amendment to the Constitution or otherwise, to
a suit brought by an employee or applicant for employ
ment of that program or activity under this Act for a
remedy authorized under subsection (c).
(B) DEFINITION- In this paragraph, the term 'program
or activity' has the meaning given the term in section
606 of the Civil Rights Act of 1 964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d4a).
(2) OFFICIALS- An official of a State may be sued in the offi
cial capacity of the official by any employee or applicant for
employment who has complied with the applicable procedures of
section 1 2, for equitable relief that is authorized under this Act.
In such a suit the court may award to the prevailing party those
costs authorized by section 722 of the Revised Statutes (42
u.s.c. 1 988).
(3) EFFECTIVE DATE- With respect to a particular program or
activity, paragraphs ( 1 ) and (2) apply to conduct occurring on or
after the day, after the date of enactment of this Act, on which a
State first receives or uses Federal financial assistance for that
program or activity.
(c) REMEDIES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATES
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, in an action or adminis
trative proceeding against the United States or a State for a violation of
this Act, remedies (including remedies at law and in equity, and interest)
are available for the violation to the same extent as the remedies are avail
able for a violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U .S.C.
2000e et seq.) by a private entity, except that-( 1 ) punitive damages are not available; and
(2) compensatory damages are available to the extent specified in
section 1 977A(b) of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 198 l a(b)).
SEC. 14. ATTORNEYS' FEES.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, in an action or adminis
trative proceeding for a violation of this Act, an entity described in
section 1 2(a) (other than paragraph (4) of such section), in the discretion
of the entity, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission
or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as
part of the costs. The Commission and the United States shall be liable
for the costs to the same extent as a private person.
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SEC. 15. POSTING NOTICES.

A covered entity who is required to post notices described in section 7 1 1
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e- 1 0) shall post notices
for employees, applicants for employment, and members, to whom the
provisions specified in section 1 2(b) apply, that describe the applicable
provisions of this Act in the manner prescribed by, and subject to the pen
alty provided under, section 7 1 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1 964.
SEC. 16. REGULATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL- Except as provided in subsections (b), (c), and (d), the
Commission shall have authority to issue regulations to carry out this Act.
(b) LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS- The Librarian of Congress shall have
authority to issue regulations to carry out this Act with respect to employ
ees and applicants for employment of the Library of Congress.
(c) BOARD- The Board referred to in section 1 2(a)(3) shall have author
ity to issue regulations to carry out this Act, in accordance with section
304 of the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1 384),
with respect to covered employees, as defined in section 1 0 1 of such Act
(2 u.s.c. 1 30 1 ) .
(d) PRESIDENT- The President shall have authority t o issue regulations
to carry out this Act with respect to covered employees, as defined in sec
tion 4 1 1 (c) of title 3, United States Code.
SEC. 17. RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER LAWS.

This Act shall not invalidate or limit the rights, remedies, or procedures
available to an individual claiming discrimination prohibited under any
other Federal law or any law of a State or political subdivision of a State.
SEC. 18. SEVERABILITY.

If any provision of this Act, or the application of the provision to any per
son or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this Act and
the application of the provision to any other person or circumstance shall
not be affected by the invalidity.
SEC. 19. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This Act shall take effect 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act
and shall not apply to conduct occurring before the effective date.

END

